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INHERITANCE FORGERY 
REID KRESS WEISBORD & DAVID HORTON† 
ABSTRACT
Many venerable norms in inheritance law were designed to prevent
forgery. Most prominently, since 1837, the Wills Act has required 
testators to express their last wishes in a signed and witnessed writing. 
Likewise, the court-supervised probate process helped ensure that a 
donative instrument was genuine and that assets passed to their rightful
owners. But in the mid-twentieth century, concern about forgery 
waned. Based in part on the perception that counterfeit estate plans are
rare, several states relaxed the Wills Act and authorized new formalities
for notarized and even digital wills. In addition, lawmakers encouraged
owners to bypass probate altogether by transmitting wealth through 
devices such as life insurance and transfer-on-death deeds. 
This Article offers a fresh look at inheritance-related forgery. 
Cutting against the conventional wisdom, it discovers that counterfeit 
donative instruments are a serious problem. Using reported cases,
empirical research, grand jury investigations, and media stories, it
reveals that courts routinely adjudicate credible claims that wills, deeds, 
and life insurance beneficiary designations are illegitimate. The Article 
then argues that the persistence of inheritance-related forgeries casts
doubt on the wisdom of some recent innovations, including statutes that
permit notarized and electronic wills. The Article also challenges well-
established inheritance law norms, including the litigation
presumptions in will-forgery contests, the widespread practice of 
rubber-stamping deeds, and the delegation of responsibility for
authenticating a nonprobate transfer to private companies. Finally, the 
Article outlines reforms to modernize succession while remaining 
sensitive to the risks of forgery.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, a widower named Earl Field died in a small Kansas town, 
leaving $20 million in property and two documents that purported to
be his will.1 One, which Field had executed in 2010, was prepared by 
his longtime attorney and left most of his assets to a charitable 
foundation run by his alma mater, Fort Hays State University
(“FHSU”).2 But a month before Field passed away, he allegedly
created a codicil—an amendment to his estate plan—by drafting a
letter that gave half of his property to his bookkeeper and caretaker,
Wanda Oborny.3 This self-made letter appeared to bear the signatures 
1. In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217, 1221 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018); Brief of Appellee Fort 
Hays State University Foundation at 2, 15, In re Field, 414 P.3d 1217 (Nos. 116,456 and 117,079),
2017 WL 2616253, at *2, *15 [hereinafter Field FHSU Brief].
 2. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1221. 
3. Field FHSU Brief, supra note 1, at 2. The letter stated in part:
Dear Joe, 
I changed my mind. I know we have [talked a lot] of what I want to do with my
estate, but I think this is the right thing to do.
Wanda has done so much for me since [my wife] died and I want to do something 
for her. I feel if it weren’t for her I would not be here. I want her to have one-half of 
my estaste [sic]. . . .
I also want [W]anda to have my home. 
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 857 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
of Field and two witnesses, Steve and Kathy Little.4 Because it seemed 
to satisfy the black-letter requirements for making a will, it enjoyed a 
presumption of validity.5 
Figure 1: Earl Field’s Purported Codicil6 
However, the circumstances surrounding the creation of this 
instrument were suspicious. Oborny initially claimed that she had 
found two similar but unwitnessed letters inside Field’s office desk
drawer.7 Only after she learned that a valid will must be executed by
attesting witnesses did she supposedly uncover the instrument that 
Steve and Kathy Little had signed.8 Even more alarmingly, when the
FBI tried to question the Littles about witnessing the disputed codicil, 
Steve killed Kathy and then committed suicide.9 Finally, although Field 
had taken pains to minimize his taxes during life, his bequest to Oborny
rather than the charitable FHSU foundation would have 
Id. app. D.
 4. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1222. 
5. Id. at 1224. 
6. Field FHSU Brief, supra note 1, app. D. 
7. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1222. 
8. Id.
 9. Id. at 1228. The Littles were friends with Oborny but barely knew Field. Id. at 1222, 1228.
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uncharacteristically saddled his estate with millions of dollars in tax 
liability.10 Because of these peculiarities, FHSU contested the 
purported codicil as a forgery.11 
The discovery of two documents broke the case open. One was a 
rough draft of the suspicious codicil prepared in Oborny’s 
handwriting.12 The second was an unwitnessed, verbatim copy of the 
purported codicil, complete with the same typographical errors and an
identical version of Field’s signature.13 Both were found in a paper 
shredder near Oborny’s desk.14 These documents suggested that 
Oborny, not Field, had drafted the purported codicil, traced Field’s
signature from another document, Xeroxed the page, and arranged for 
the Littles to sign it.15 
Figure 2: The Handwritten and Shredded Drafts of the 
Purported Codicil16 
***
In 2014, Jennifer Merin went to inspect a house she was about to 
inherit in Queens, New York, and found Darrell Beatty, a stranger, 
10. Id. at 1232. 
11. Id. at 1223. 
12. Id. at 1230. 
13. Id. at 1226. 
14. Id. at 1230. 
15. See id. at 1226–27.
 16. Field FHSU Brief, supra note 1, apps. E and F. 
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 859 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
living there.17 The property had been in Merin’s family for eight
decades and was going to belong to her when she finished 
administering her mother’s estate.18 Nevertheless, she discovered that
Beatty had changed the locks, broken the garage door, taken her car, 
and either stolen or broken the heirlooms inside.19 
Figure 3: Damage Inside Merin’s Home20 
When the police arrived, Merin’s nightmare intensified.21 Telling
the officers that he was the real owner, Beatty produced a deed to the 
house in his name.22 Although this document lacked a legal description
and stated that Beatty had purchased title from a dead person 
“residing” at a nonexistent address, it had been officially recorded by
the New York City Register.23 Thus, the police refused to intervene.24 
***
17. Merin v. City of New York, No. 713069/15, 2016 WL 3454185, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
12, 2016).
 18. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint at 4, Merin,  2016 WL 3417989 [hereinafter Merin Opposition Brief]; Barbara Ross, 
Woman, 72, Whose Family House Was Stolen Through Deed Fraud Has No Right To Sue, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 13, 2016, 5:18 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens/house-
scam-victim-no-sue-queens-judge-rules-article-1.2636121 [https://perma.cc/D2GE-YQXC].
 19. Merin Opposition Brief, supra note 18, at 6.
 20. Ross, supra note 18. 
21. See Merin Opposition Brief, supra note 18, at 6.
 22. Id. 
23. Id. at 5.
 24. Id. at 6.
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In 2008, Daniel Parker, who lived in Mississippi, bought a policy 
from Chesapeake Life Insurance Company.25 Daniel named his wife, 
Gathel, as the death beneficiary and his daughter, Jessica, as the
contingent beneficiary.26 In 2014, Daniel separated from Gathel, 
moved to Wisconsin, and began living with his sister, Connie.27 A year 
later, Chesapeake received a beneficiary-change request in which 
Daniel ostensibly substituted Connie for Gathel as the primary
beneficiary.28 There was just one problem: the signature on Daniel’s 
2008 life insurance application looked nothing like the signature on his 
2015 change request.29 Thus, after Daniel died in 2016, Gathel and 
Jessica challenged the 2015 form as a “blatant forgery.”30 
Figure 4: Daniel’s 2008 Life Insurance Application31 
Figure 5: Daniel’s 2015 Purported Beneficiary-Change Request32 
***
Forgery was once the great boogeyman of inheritance law. This 
concern is easy to understand. Inheritance law’s primary goal is to 
honor an owner’s intent about how to distribute her property at 
25. Chesapeake Life Ins. v. Parker, No. 18-C-643, 2018 WL 4188469, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 
31, 2018).
 26. Id.
 27. Id. at *2, *4.
 28. Id. at *1. 
29. Id. at *1. 
30. Order Denying Summary Judgment at 7, Chesapeake Life Ins., 2018 WL 2766205, at *3. 
31. Daniel R. Parker Life Insurance Application with Chesapeake Life Insurance Co. at 2,
Chesapeake Life Ins., 2018 WL 2766205 (filed June 30, 2017). 
32. Daniel R. Parker Beneficiary Change Request with Chesapeake Life Insurance Co. at 2,
Chesapeake Life Ins., 2018 WL 2766205 (filed June 30, 2017). 
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death.33 But the succession process suffers from what is known as the 
“worst evidence” problem: decedents cannot speak up to correct the
record, clarify their wishes, or protect their interests.34 In turn, this 
informational vacuum creates a window for opportunists. 
Historically, the legal system went to great lengths to close this 
gap. For example, the first criminal laws against forgery, which 
emerged in ancient Rome, were specifically designed to combat phony 
wills.35 Likewise, the Wills Act of 1837 requires testators to sign their 
wills before two witnesses who are present at the same time to “guard 
against forgery.”36 And the practice of requiring probate court 
supervision helps prevent estate fraud, such as theft of a decedent’s real 
property by deed forgery.37 These measures reflected the idea that
forgery was a grave threat to the orderly flow of assets from the dead
to the living. 
But in the twentieth century, perceptions changed. Critics 
observed that courts were rejecting would-be testamentary 
instruments for minor deviations from the Wills Act, making the law 
of will execution “notorious for its harsh and relentless formalism.”38 
As a result, the greatest barrier to implementing a decedent’s intent no 
longer seemed to be outsiders hijacking the execution process; rather, 
it seemed to be the execution process itself. Likewise, dissatisfaction 
with the cumbersome probate system fed the consensus that court 
supervision of estates was “cautious to the point of absurdity.”39 
Consequently, the cures for estate-related forgery came to be seen as
worse than the disease. 
This critical view of traditional probate protections left a deep
imprint on the law. Over the last two decades, the Uniform Probate
Code (“UPC”) and several jurisdictions have authorized unwitnessed
but notarized wills and permitted courts to forgive harmless deviations 
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2003); Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 
51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941).
34. John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044, 2046 (1994) (book review).
35. J. W. Cecil Turner, “Documents” in the Law of Forgery, 32 VA. L. REV. 939, 941 (1946). 
36. Waller v. Waller, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 454, 476 (1845); see Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict.
c. 26, § 9 (Eng., Wales & N. Ir.). 
37. See, e.g., PAULA A. MONOPOLI, AMERICAN PROBATE: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC,
IMPROVING THE PROCESS 57 (2003) (describing probate’s title-clearing function). 
38. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 
(1975). 
39. Charles Dent Bostick, The Revocable Trust: A Means of Avoiding Probate in the Small 
Estate?, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 44, 48 (1968).
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from the Wills Act.40 In an even sharper break from tradition, a handful 
of states have recently passed laws permitting testators to create
electronic wills.41 Finally, in a movement called the nonprobate 
revolution, owners began structuring their estate plans around devices 
that can transmit wealth without court oversight, such as life insurance
and transfer-on-death deeds (“TODDs”).42 These developments stem, 
in part, from “the prevailing view . . . that forgery is rare.”43 
This Article challenges this conventional wisdom by offering the
first scholarly investigation of forgery related to decedents’ estates 
(“inheritance forgery”).44 It begins by demonstrating that inheritance
forgery has not disappeared. In fact, since 2000, there have been 
several hundred reported opinions involving a litigated claim of 
inheritance forgery. And in more than one hundred such cases,
inheritance forgery was a central issue in the litigation. Additionally,
the number of undetected forgeries, unprobated estates, and privately 
settled disputes, as well as the enormous volume of summary court 
adjudications, surely dwarfs the number of litigated cases that have 
generated a reported judicial opinion. This steady stream of disputes
has exposed the confusion surrounding forgery litigation. For example, 
related doctrines such as undue influence have well-oiled burden-
shifting rubrics that streamline will contests.45 But because forgery 
doctrines do not possess such mechanisms, this type of misconduct is 
difficult and often expensive to prove. Consider the forged codicil in In 
re Estate of Field.46 Although this instrument might seem like an
obvious sham in hindsight, FHSU needed nine days, thirty witnesses,
and over three hundred exhibits to prevail at trial.47 In fact, Oborny
40. See infra Part I.B.
 41. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
42. For the classic article on this movement, see generally John H. Langbein, The 
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984)
[hereinafter Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution]. For more on the basics of TODDs, see
Stephanie Emrick, Note, Transfer on Death Deeds: It Is Time To Establish the Rules of the Game, 
70 FLA. L. REV. 469, 473–81 (2018).
 43. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 
571 n.193 (1990). 
44. This Article uses the term “inheritance forgery” to describe the broad range of forgery
schemes that target the transfer of property shortly before, during, or shortly after the owner’s
death.
 45. See infra Part III.A.2.
 46. In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018); see supra notes 1–16 and 
accompanying text.
 47. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1221.
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 863 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
came so close to winning that the trial court granted her $1 million 
under a state statute that authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees for “any 
person named in a will or purported codicil . . . [who] prosecutes any 
proceedings in good faith.”48 
Unfortunately, inheritance forgery is not limited to wills. The
phenomenon also mars other popular gratuitous transfers. Scores of 
recent newspaper articles49 and a startling December 2018 Grand Jury 
Report from the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office have described 
a national “epidemic” of counterfeit deeds involving real property 
owned by estates.50 These bogus documents exploit a glaring loophole 
in municipal deed-recording practices: officials often cannot refuse to
48. Id. at 1234 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1504 (2018)). However, the trial court’s award
of attorney’s fees was reversed on appeal. Id. at 1235. 
49. In Philadelphia, for instance, investigative journalist Craig McCoy has reported 
extensively for the Philadelphia Inquirer on the scale and scope of the deed-theft problem. See
Craig R. McCoy, Stealing from the Dead, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/a/house-sales-fraud-theft-philadelphia-real-estate-dead-owners-
william-johnson-20190124.html [https://perma.cc/YS5P-FQZK] (“They are all dead. Yet if city 
records are to be believed, they all walked into the office of a notary public and signed away their
homes, which just happened to be in gentrifying neighborhoods with soaring property values.”);
see also Craig R. McCoy, After a Mass Theft of Philly Houses, Foreign Nationals Flee the Country,
DA Says, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 1, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/housing-theft-
philadelphia-deeds-fraud-20190501.html [https://perma.cc/Y266-FJN4]; Craig R. McCoy, Ex-Con
Charged with Stealing Homes from the Dead, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/theft-housing-fraud-deeds-willliam-johnson-krasner-
20190207.html [https://perma.cc/GH4F-XQQY]; Craig R. McCoy, In Philly, Your House Being 
Ripped Off Isn’t Always Enough To Get Help from Police and the DA, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 6, 
2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/house-theft-philadelphia-larry-krasner-forged-deeds-
20190706.html [https://perma.cc/6HLK-NT3B]; Craig R. McCoy, Philly DA Charges Point Breeze
Man with Stealing Properties from the Dead, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/housing-theft-robert-stokes-district-attorney-larry-krasner-
20190308.html [https://perma.cc/55BU-8FHQ]; Craig R. McCoy, A Real Estate Fortune Built on
a Foundation of Forged Deeds and Tangled Titles, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 29, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/house-theft-philadelphia-deeds-forgery-20190529.html [https:// 
perma.cc/JU4W-UFET]; Craig R. McCoy, Seven Ways the City Can Crack Down on House Theft, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (June 3, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/house-theft-deeds-fraud-
forgery-philadelphia-20190603.html [https://perma.cc/2GBY-MSAB]; Craig R. McCoy, With
Questionable Signatures and a Dubious Will, a Man Lays Claim to a Dead Woman’s House, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/deed-will-forged-house-theft-
philadelphia-william-johnson-20190221.html [https://perma.cc/W6UY-WJPY]. This Article
discusses deed forgery in detail in infra Part II.B.
 50. GRAND JURY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE
GRAND JURY 1, 8 (2018) [hereinafter Manhattan Grand Jury Report] (noting that the grand jury
received “evidence establishing that homeowners who purportedly signed deeds to convey their
properties had been deceased several years earlier, or even several decades before the alleged
conveyance”).
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record a suspicious instrument.51 The New York Daily News illustrated
the absurdity of this practice when, in a publicity stunt, it used a fake 
notary stamp and two fictitious names to obtain title to the Empire
State Building.52 As con artists like Darrell Beatty in Merin v. City of 
New York53 have recognized, property owned by the deceased is 
particularly vulnerable.
Finally, fake life insurance beneficiary designations are also a 
pressing problem. Recall the discrepancy between the signature on
Daniel Parker’s 2008 application to Chesapeake and his alleged 2015
change-of-beneficiary form.54 At trial, Daniel’s sister, Connie, admitted
that she “actually signed the form using Daniel’s name.”55 How could
an insurance company fail to detect such a conspicuous fabrication? 
The answer is surprising: these firms have little incentive to discourage 
forgery. Indeed, if an insurer learns of a forgery allegation before it has 
paid the proceeds, it can file an interpleader action. This procedural 
step forces the parties with a stake in the matter to litigate while the
insurer recovers its attorneys’ fees and costs for “render[ing] beneficial
services” to the court.56 Alternatively, if an insurer disburses funds to a 
wrongdoer, it can invoke what are known as “facility-of-payment”
statutes to shield itself from liability.57 Liberated from the specter of
liability, life insurers impose private formalities that fail to provide 
meaningful protection against inheritance forgery. 
This Article then suggests reforms that would strike a balance 
between permitting inheritance law to evolve while deterring 
inheritance forgery. First, it explains why a close reading of will-forgery
cases can help states update their Wills Acts and simplify forgery 
disputes by importing a version of the burden-shifting regime from
undue influence. Second, it contends that local officials could contain 
the problem of estate-related deed forgery by adopting a few 
51. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
 52. See William Sherman, It Took 90 Minutes for Daily News To “Steal” the Empire State 
Building, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2008, 10:46 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
money/90-minutes-daily-news-steal-empire-state-building-article-1.353477 [https://perma.cc/
ZZA9-QN9N].
53. Merin v. City of New York, No. 713069/15, 2016 WL 3454185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 
2016); see supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
 54. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
55. Chesapeake Life Ins. v. Parker, No. 18-C-643, 2018 WL 4188469, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 
31, 2018).
56. Nat’l Life Ins. v. Alembik-Eisner, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
 57. See infra Part II.C. 
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 865 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
straightforward measures. Third, it argues that insurance companies 
should sometimes face liability when they fail to establish reasonable 
protections against fake beneficiary designations.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the history of 
inheritance forgery from ancient Rome to the most recent revisions to 
the UPC. It shows that forgery’s perceived irrelevance has driven some
of the most important developments in the field of inheritance law. 
Part II cuts against this received wisdom by revealing that inheritance
forgery continues to threaten the transfer of property at death. Part III 
then uses insights from this research to outline how states could
continue to modernize the succession process while also deterring
wrongdoing.
I. THE HISTORY OF INHERITANCE FORGERY
This Part traces the history of forgery in inheritance law. It reveals 
that many of the ancient rules that populate the field were designed to
detect counterfeit wills. It also demonstrates that courts have long
struggled with the finer points of forgery contests, such as which party 
bears the burden of proof. Finally, it explains how policymakers and 
scholars in the second half of the twentieth century lost sight of these
issues. 
A. Traditional Protections Against Forgery 
Trying to pass off a bogus instrument as legitimate—an act known 
by the archaic phrase “uttering” a forgery58—was once considered a 
serious offense. The first statute against counterfeiting emerged in 81 
B.C., and it was “mainly concerned with [the] falsification of
testamentary dispositions.”59 Likewise, in the third century, Roman law 
extravagantly declared that “[a]nyone who writes . . . a forged will 
. . . shall be deported to an island.”60 Believe it or not, Anglo-American 
law was even more severe. In Georgian England, as society became
increasingly reliant on paper credit, Parliament passed 120 separate 
laws against forgery, half of which imposed the death penalty.61 
58. See State v. Washington, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 120, 122 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 1791).
 59. Turner, supra note 35, at 941.
 60. 1 S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 302 (1932). 
61. Randall McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows: The Punishment of Forgery in the Age of
the Financial Revolution, 165 PAST & PRESENT 107, 107 (1999) [hereinafter McGowen, From
Pillory to Gallows]. Likewise, in early America, “death was considered the only fit punishment
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Between 1741 and 1773, at least five people were sent to the gallows 
for attempting to probate sham wills.62 Eventually, however, public 
opinion changed, and these punishments were seen as draconian.63 In 
1832, lawmakers demoted forgery of commercial instruments from a 
capital crime to a mere felony.64 They extended the same leniency to 
creating fake wills in 1837.65 
Similarly, many important civil norms were designed to ensure the 
authenticity of testamentary instruments. Execution formalities, for 
example, date back to 1666, when the Great Fire of London destroyed 
the city’s property records.66 Because “the effect and even existence of 
wills were fruitful sources of dispute,” it was often unclear who owned
land that had been passed down through the generations.67 In response, 
Parliament enacted the Statute of Frauds in 1677, which required wills 
that transmitted land to be written, signed by the testator, and attested 
by witnesses.68 A century and a half later, Parliament passed the Wills 
Act, which extended these rules to all wills and added the requirement
that witnesses be “present at the same time” for the testator’s 
execution of the will or acknowledgement of a prior signature.69 These
formalities crossed the Atlantic with the adoption of local Wills Acts 
by every American state.70 As the Virginia Supreme Court explained 
for the crime of forgery.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
see Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. 112, 115 (imposing the death penalty for forgery).
 62. See Randall McGowen, Forgery and the Twelve Judges in Eighteenth-Century England, 
29 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 225–26, 231, 238 & n.46, 245 (2011). Although many property offenses
were capital crimes, these forgery cases stand out because juries at that time often found creative 
ways to avoid convicting defendants of nonviolent offenses punishable by death. See ADAM JAY 
HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA 41
(1992). 
63. Phil Handler, Forgery and the End of the “Bloody Code” in Early Nineteenth-Century 
England, 48 HIST. J. 683, 684 (2005) (“Forgery became the focal point for opposition to the death
penalty . . . .”).
 64. See 2 & 3 Will. 4 c. 62 & c. 123 (1832) (UK). 
65. See 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (1837) (Eng., Wales & N. Ir.).
 66. See Philip Hamburger, The Conveyancing Purposes of the Statute of Frauds, 27 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 354, 364–66 (1983). 
67. Id. at 366.
 68. See Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng. & Wales). 
69. Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 9 (Eng., Wales & N. Ir.).
 70. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 226–27 (8th ed. 2009). 
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 867 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
in 1845, will-execution formalities sought to “connect[] . . . the 
instrument with the testator so as to guard against forgery.”71 
Roughly half of U.S. jurisdictions also recognize holographic wills, 
which are valid without witness attestation if all the material provisions 
are in the testator’s handwriting and she has signed the document.72 In 
theory, holographic wills contain enough of the testator’s handwriting
for courts to detect forged wills without witness attestation.73 But
opinions diverge about whether this formality is adequate.74 
Probate—the court-based regime for administering decedents’ 
estates—was also designed with vigilance in mind. For starters, it 
establishes a layer of judicial review that backstops the Wills Act 
formalities.75 Other transfers, such as gifts and contracts, only find their 
way into the legal system if they breed litigation, but probate requires 
every proponent of every will to persuade a court that it is valid.76 
Probate also culminates in a court order that formalizes the transfer of 
assets from the dead to the living.77 This paper trail is especially useful 
for conveying real estate because it makes “records . . . more exact[] 
and title . . . less clouded.”78 
Despite these safeguards, forgery claims continued to arise during 
the nineteenth century. These cases revealed diverging views about the 
appropriate procedural framework for forgery contests. For one, it was 
unclear whether the proponent or the contestant bore the burden of 
71. Waller v. Waller, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 454, 476 (1845); see also Murray v. Lewis, 121 A. 525,
527 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (“These [formal testamentary] provisions are reasonable and easily
understood and their purpose is to prevent frauds.”). 
72. See, e.g., Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against
Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 93 n.2 (2006). The recognition of holographic wills is
based on principles from the Napoleonic Code that likely evolved from will-writing practices in
Ancient Rome. See R.H. Helmholz, The Transmission of Legal Institutions: English Law, Roman
Law, and Handwritten Wills, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 147, 153 (1994).
 73. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 33, at 13; Lindgren, supra note 43, at 558. 
74. See Mark Glover, Minimizing Probate-Error Risk, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 335, 381 
n.213 (2016) (“Some argue that holographs are particularly susceptible to fraud and forgery.”);
Kevin R. Natale, Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 169 (1988) (“Because of the absence of an attestation requirement, a
legitimate concern with holographic wills is that there be sufficient protection against forgery or
fraud.”).
 75. See, e.g., LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 401 (1946)
(describing the traditional powers of probate courts).
 76. See, e.g., Edward H. Ward & J. H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 
WIS. L. REV. 393, 394 (1950) (“The transfer of wealth on death typically involves the formal
intervention of the state to a degree not true of inter vivos transfers.”). 
77. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 42, at 1117. 
78. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 249 (2d ed. 1985). 
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868 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
proof.79 As noted earlier, the party seeking to enforce a will must have 
made a threshold showing that it satisfies the Wills Act.80 Arguably, 
this meant that if there was doubt about the authenticity of a document,
the proponent needed to show that it was real.81 Yet most courts 
treated forgery as an affirmative defense, like fraud or undue influence, 
that the challenger must establish by clear and convincing evidence.82 
This meant that forgery contestants not only bore the burden of proof, 
but they also had to satisfy that burden with evidence that was 
especially persuasive. However, the requisite degree of persuasion was 
not uniform across the states, as courts devised sui generis, loosely 
defined evidentiary standards to deal with will forgeries. For instance,
the South Carolina Supreme Court remarked in 1908 that a contestant 
“must satisfy the court of [forgery] by something more than mere
romance and suspicion.”83 
In addition, the use of attestation clauses and self-proving 
affidavits—short paragraphs within the will in which the witnesses 
declare they saw the testator sign or acknowledge the document— 
muddied the waters. Although these provisions can easily be 
counterfeited, courts viewed them as powerful badges of legitimacy.84 
For example, in Newell v. White,85 two witnesses who had no pecuniary
interest in the estate were alleged by the proponent to have attested
the will, but they swore at trial that they had neither signed the will nor 
79. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Confidential Relations and Burden of Proof of Undue 
Influence in Will Cases, 26 YALE L.J. 62, 63 (1916) (“There has been much confusion in the rules
determining the incidence of the burden of proof upon a proceeding for the probate of a will.”).
 80. See, e.g., Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 658, 663–64 (1870) (“[T]he proponent must first 
proceed with proof of the due execution of the will.”).
 81. See, e.g., In re Simcox’s Estate, 11 Pa. C. 545, 550 (Orphans’ Ct. 1892), 1892 WL 2904, at 
*5 (“[T]he burden is upon [the proponent] to prove affirmatively the execution of the paper.”);
Newell v. White, 73 A. 798, 804 (R.I. 1908) (Blodgett, J., dissenting) (remarking in a forgery
contest that “the burden of proving the due and solemn execution of this instrument, which the 
law wisely casts upon the proponents, has not been sustained”).
 82. Cf. Colby v. Richards, 107 A. 867, 868 (Me. 1919) (“[W]hen a serious crime like forgery
is set up in a civil action, the evidence to sustain the charge must be full, clear, and convincing.”);
Gillis v. Smith, 75 So. 451, 452–53 (Miss. 1917) (“[T]he person alleging that a contract, deed, gift,
or will was procured through the exercise of undue influence has the burden of proving that
fact. . . . The proof must be clear and convincing.” (omission in original) (quoting 1 HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF 
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 253 (1916))). 
83. Thames v. Rouse, 62 S.E. 254, 254 (S.C. 1908) (quoting the challenged opinion of the 
circuit court).
 84. See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Murphy (In re Estate of Murphy), 131 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Minn. 1964) 
(describing the traditional evidentiary potency of attestation clauses).
85. Newell v. White, 73 A. 798 (R.I. 1908).
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 869 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
even knew of its existence.86 Nevertheless, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court admitted the instrument to probate, relying on the purported 
will’s attestation clause rather than the witnesses’ live testimony in 
court: 
A will, duly attested upon its face, . . . may be admitted to probate,
although none of the subscribing witnesses are able to swear, from
recollection, that the formalities required by the statute were 
complied with, and even although some of them should swear
positively that they were not . . . .87 
Finally, the evidence in forgery cases was rarely clear. As one
attorney put it, forgery is a “deed[] of darkness” that can be hard to
either prove or disprove.88 Forgery contests usually devolved into a 
“great mass of conflicting testimony.”89 Occasionally, the will’s 
witnesses took the stand, followed by a second wave of witnesses who 
spoke to the original witnesses’ credibility.90 Sometimes, judges offered 
their own opinions about the authenticity of the testator’s signature. 
For example, one New Jersey court decided that the handwriting on a 
purported will “lacks the life of the genuine signature” and “presents 
the appearance of a labored and dead production.”91 In other cases,
litigants called a motley assortment of “experts,” such as “cashiers and 
tellers of different banks in this city, who were accustomed to examine 
hundreds of signatures each day”92 or longtime “merchants and 
bookkeepers [who] . . . had seen a great many handwritings.”93 
Eventually, an entire cottage industry emerged of professional 
handwriting analysts.94 This was the birth of forensic science, a 
86. Id. at 799.
 87. Id. at 800 (quoting Orser v. Orser, 24 N.Y. 51, 52 (1861)).
 88. McGowen, From Pillory to Gallows, supra note 61, at 115 n.16.
 89. See Smith v. Smith’s Ex’rs, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 308, 308–09 (1821).
 90. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 92, 97 (1846) (“A great number of persons have
been examined in relation to the credit of these witnesses. Many support, and some discredit,
them.”).
 91. In re Gordon’s Will, 26 A. 268, 277 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1893), aff’d sub nom. Gordon v. Old,
30 A. 19 (N.J. 1894).
 92. In re Williams’ Will, 15 N.Y.S. 828, 833 (Sur. Ct. 1891), aff’d, 19 N.Y.S. 778 (Gen. Term
1892), aff’d, 36 N.E. 345 (N.Y. 1894).
93. Kennedy v. Upshaw, 1 S.W. 308 (Tex. 1886) (West Headnote 3); Kennedy v. Upshaw, 64
Tex. 411, 420 (1885) (affirming the qualification of expert witnesses who offered opinion
testimony at trial regarding the authenticity of signatures on the will).
94. Professional handwriting experts emerged before the dawn of the twentieth century. See, 
e.g., In re Williams’ Will, 15 N.Y.S. at 833; The Taylor Will Case, 10 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 300, 314 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1871).
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870 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
discipline that has long been controversial because it was “invented
specifically for use in the legal arena.”95 
B. The Marginalization of Forgery 
Despite these developments, massive changes in inheritance law 
gradually deflected attention away from forgery. To begin with, the 
unforgiving rules of will execution began to seem like a greater danger 
to testamentary freedom than the remote possibility of probating
counterfeit wills. Courts have refused to enforce writings for trivial 
deviations from the statutory mandates since the passage of the Wills 
Act, such as when the testator signed the wrong page96 or a witness 
stepped out of the room too early.97 But as one prescient author 
asserted in 1875, this practice “ha[d] not succeeded in preventing 
forgeries,” but had instead nullified many “genuine wills.”98 Likewise,
in a seminal 1941 piece, Ashbel Gulliver and Catherine Tilson argued
that orthodox wills law was overprotective because, unlike the 
seventeenth-century practice of executing death-bed wills, modern 
testators typically prepare estate plans at a younger age, thereby
avoiding the danger of executing a donative instrument in a vulnerable
state of cognitive decline.99 
Observations like these fed the perception that “forged wills are 
rare”100 and “just the stuff of novels.”101 Academics began to mention 
95. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification 
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1727 (2001).
 96. See, e.g., McGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W.2d 702, 703, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (holding
that a testator failed to sign a will when her signature appeared on a separate affidavit that was 
attached to the will). 
97. See, e.g., In re Groffman [1968] 1 W.L.R. 733 at 739 (Eng.) (holding that a will was not
witnessed by people who were “present at the same time” when they entered the room where the
testator was acknowledging his signature mere moments apart).
 98. The Adolphus Will Case, LAW J. 561, 562 (1875); see also Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving 
Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 60 (1985) [hereinafter
Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits] (“Courts . . . routinely invalidate wills on formal grounds despite
ample evidence that the document offered for probate accurately represents the testator’s
intent.”).
 99. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 33, at 10. But see Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner,
Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the
Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341, 360 tbl.1 (2017) (finding that 93 percent of decedents in a
sample of probate cases were sixty years or older at death and that 61 percent of wills were
executed within ten years of death).
 100. Lindgren, supra note 43, at 558; see id. at 571 n.193 (“[T]he prevailing view of scholars 
[is] that forgery is rare . . . .”).
 101. See Arden Dale, Forged Wills Are Now Not Just Fiction, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2009, 12:09
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704107204574475221527317840 [https://
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 871 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
forgery only to dismiss it as outmoded and irrelevant: a phenomenon
that once may have been “a significant risk,” but now is much “less 
prevalent.”102 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and 
Other Donative Transfers does not even list forgery as a grounds for 
refusing to enforce a will.103 Assuming that forgery was no longer a
major concern, the legal system began to dilute longstanding defenses
against misconduct in the will-execution process.104 Eleven jurisdictions 
have adopted a novel rule called “harmless error,” which allows courts 
to probate a noncompliant writing if there is strong evidence that the 
decedent intended it to be her will.105 In the same vein, the UPC and 
several states abolished what are known as “purging statutes,” which 
require “interested witnesses”—those who have a dual role in the will 
as both beneficiary and attesting witness—to forfeit their 
perma.cc/E7PB-ZEX8] (discrediting this contention). 
102. Glover, supra note 74, at 355. Citing the prevailing view of scholars, even one of us has
recited the conventional wisdom that “deathbed wills and deed forgeries are uncommon.” Reid 
Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
877, 914 (2012).
 103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2003) (mentioning fraud, undue influence, and duress). In a comment, the Restatement 
observes that “[i]f the donor’s signature on a donative document was forged, the document is not 
valid because the document was not signed by the donor.” Id. cmt. o. This suggests that forgery is
not an independent defense to enforcement, but rather an application of the general principle 
that a will must be “signed by the testator.” Id. § 3.1. However, the Restatement also provides
that “the burden of establishing . . . forgery . . . is on the party contesting the validity of the
donative transfer.” Id. § 8.3 cmt. o. This is confusing, because it seems to contradict the general
principle that the proponent of the will bears the burden of proving that the testator signed it. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 34.7 (AM. LAW. INST. 1992) does not mention forgery at all in its discussion of 
transfers induced by undue influence, duress, fraud, or mistake.
104. Forgery is still prohibited by criminal law, but it is no longer a capital crime. See, e.g., 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(d), 170.10 (McKinney 2018) (prohibiting the falsification of deeds,
wills, codicils, and contracts as forgery in the second degree, a class D felony punishable by seven
years’ imprisonment). Some prosecutors, however, have stated publicly that inheritance forgery
is a low priority. See Craig R. McCoy, A Philadelphia Story: Falsely Declared Dead, Home Stolen 
and No One Will Help, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 2, 2018) [hereinafter McCoy, A Philadelphia
Story], https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/breaking/stolen-abandoned-houses-deeds-theft-
fraud-philadelphia-20180629.html [https://perma.cc/QBJ4-GHWW]. 
105. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-503 (2018); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-503 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 72-2-523 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West
2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.238 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2018); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2018); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503
(amended 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). 
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872 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
inheritance.106 The UPC’s drafters believed that purging statutes were
more likely to punish innocent beneficiaries than to deter misconduct 
by interested beneficiaries against vulnerable testators.107 Fourteen
jurisdictions and the UPC have similarly liberalized the requirements 
for holographic wills by mandating that only the “signature and the 
material provisions [or portions] of the will”—rather than the entire
document—be written “in the testator’s handwriting.”108 This reform 
allows courts to validate a holograph “even though immaterial parts 
such as date or introductory wording are printed, typed, or stamped.”109 
Lastly, in 2008, the UPC authorized testators to secure a notary’s 
approval instead of witnesses.110 This maneuver sought to align the law 
with a common—but mistaken—view that notarization is a proper 
substitute for witness attestation.111 Lawrence Waggoner, one of the 
UPC’s reporters, acknowledged that this relaxation of the Wills Act 
might create the “possibility of wrongdoing” but ultimately dismissed 
this concern: 
To be sure, someone could forge a relative’s will and, using fake 
identification, perhaps succeed in getting it notarized. That danger is
also present, however, in the case of an attested will in which, under
the UPC and many non-UPC statutes, the attesting witnesses need
not know the testator and need not be disinterested. A fraudulent 
will, whether attested or notarized, would typically be challenged by 
106. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505(b) (“The signing of a will by an interested witness does 
not invalidate the will or any provision of it.”); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-525; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-08-05 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-505.
107. The UPC drafters predicted that rational wrongdoers would want to avoid compromising
the appearance of their own objectivity by keeping themselves at arm’s length from the will-
making process; thus, instead of signing as an attesting witnesses, wrongdoers would prefer to
“procure disinterested witnesses.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505(b) cmt.
 108. Id. § 2-503 cmt. (“material provisions”); Id. § 2-502(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 145
(1998) (“material portions”); see also  ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.502(b) (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-2502B, 2503 (2019); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111; COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502(2), (3);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-502(b), (c); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-503 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-
503 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2502(2), (3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522(2), (3); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02(2), (3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-
502(a), (c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-105 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502(2), (3). 
109. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(b) cmt.
 110. See id. § 2-502(a)(3)(B); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-08-02.
 111. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) cmt. 
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 873 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
the decedent’s disappointed relatives. The law has long relied upon
the courts to identify such cases and rule accordingly.112 
The movement to modernize the Wills Act has shifted into high 
gear since 2017. Because millennials “are so acclimated to digital and
electronic forms of communication that they seldom encounter sheets 
of paper in their daily lives,” there has been rising interest in bringing
the law of will execution into the digital age.113 Companies that offer 
do-it-yourself legal services, including LegalZoom and Bequest, Inc., 
began trying to persuade state legislatures to permit them to oversee 
the creation of digital wills over the internet and then serve as 
“qualified custodians” who would “store the executed electronic 
document[] for an additional fee.”114 As a result, several American
jurisdictions have either passed or are considering laws that expressly 
validate electronic wills,115 and the Uniform Law Commission has 
released a draft Electronic Wills Act.116 
Meanwhile, as the rules of will execution were evolving, a 
movement known as the nonprobate revolution transformed the 
estate-planning industry. In 1965, Norman Dacey published How to
Avoid Probate!, a surprise best-seller that contended that the 
conventional court-bound process for administering decedents’ assets 
was slow, expensive, and unnecessary.117 Individuals began relying on 
“will substitutes,” such as pensions, joint accounts, and revocable
trusts, all of which transmit wealth privately.118 
112. Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Authorizes Notarized Wills, 34 ACTEC L.J. 83, 84,
86 (2008) (footnote omitted).
113. John H. Langbein, Absorbing South Australia’s Wills Act Dispensing Power in the United 
States: Emulation, Resistance, Expansion, 38 ADEL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017); see also Developments in
the Law: More Data, More Problems, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1714, 1790–91 (2018) (describing societal
forces that have sparked interest in electronic wills); David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The
Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 563–77 (2017) (explaining why it is
unclear whether e-wills are valid under traditional wills law).
 114. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, DRAFT: ELECTRONIC WILLS
ACT 2 (Oct. 24, 2018) [hereinafter DRAFT ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT],
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile 
Key=5713cffd-8bf2-e628-4469-aa8152b81931&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/P8C3-HL47]. 
115. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2019); H.B. 2656, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018);
H.E.A. 1303, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018); DRAFT ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT, 
supra note 114, at 2 (noting that e-will legislation is pending in California, Florida, and New
Hampshire). 
116. DRAFT ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT, supra note 114, at 1–2.
 117. See NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE—UPDATED! 15–23 (2d ed. 1980). 
118. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 42, at 1109–15 (surveying these
methods).
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874 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
Two of these mechanisms are especially important for our 
purposes. First, fueled by the desire for probate avoidance, the total 
amount of life insurance coverage in the United States soared from 
$586 billion in 1960119 to $20.8 trillion in 2015, as measured in nominal
dollars.120 Second, in the last decade, sixteen states have passed the
Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act (“URPTDA”), which
allows owners to convey land posthumously simply by naming a 
beneficiary on a TODD and recording that deed as the property’s 
formal titling instrument.121 The designation of death beneficiaries for 
both of these techniques is functionally identical to the equivalent
procedure for wills because the owner can freely amend them until she 
passes away.122 Yet neither needs to comply with the Wills Act. Indeed,
insurance companies promulgate their own idiosyncratic formalities 
that govern what insureds must do to name or change beneficiaries.123 
Likewise, TODDs must only bear the grantor’s signature and a 
notary’s seal.124 These changes demonstrate that lawmakers have
become much less preoccupied with ensuring that a purported donative 
transfer is genuine. 
In sum, the need to prevent estate-related forgery was once a
major concern, but now it barely registers on the policymaking radar.
Next, this Article explains why the legal system should take inheritance 
forgery more seriously. 
119. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A BLS READER ON
PRODUCTIVITY 174 (1983). 
120. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2016, at 63 (2016), 
https://www.acli.com/-/media/ACLI/Files/Fact-Books-Public/2016LIFactBook.ashx?la=en
[https://perma.cc/JL69-PWQ4].
 121. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009); see ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 13.48.010–.195 (2018); D.C. CODE §§ 19-604.01–.19 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 527-1 
to -17 (2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 27/1 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-3401 to -3423 (2018);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.655–.699 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, §§ 45-6-401 to -417 (2018); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-32.1-01 to -14 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 93.948–.979 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 29A-6-401 to -435 (2018); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 114.001–.152 (West 2018); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-621 to -638 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 64.80.010–.904 (2018); W. VA. CODE §§
36-12-1 to -17 (2018); H.B. 94, 2018 Leg., REG. SESS. (Utah 2018).
 122. See UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 6 (“A transfer on death deed is
revocable even if the deed or another instrument contains a contrary provision.”); Langbein, The 
Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 42, at 1110 (explaining why “[t]he beneficiary designation in
a life insurance policy serves precisely the function of the designation of a devisee in a will”).
 123. See infra Part II.C. 
124. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 9 (“A transfer on death deed . . . must
contain the essential elements and formalities of a properly recordable inter vivos deed”); id. cmt.
(explaining what those elements are).
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II. MODERN INHERITANCE FORGERY
This Part examines the three most problematic types of 
inheritance forgery: wills, real-property deeds, and life insurance
death-beneficiary designations. To challenge the prevailing view that
inheritance forgery is a de minimis problem, we reviewed several 
hundred recently reported judicial opinions that addressed or 
mentioned a claim of inheritance forgery. We then analyzed in greater 
detail more than one hundred court cases decided since 2000 in which
inheritance forgery was a central issue in the litigation.125 The
discussion in this Part focuses on the latter set of cases. Along the way, 
this Part also identifies regulatory gaps that may contribute to the 
pervasiveness of falsified instruments in modern wealth transfer. 
A. Wills 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the ancient scam of will forgery 
remains a serious problem. To understand the modern practice of will 
forgery and how courts have dealt with will-forgery contests, we 
examined more than forty court decisions in the last two decades in 
which a contestant asserted a nonfrivolous claim of will forgery.126 We 
collect those opinions in Table 1 of the Appendix. In a majority of cases 
decided on the merits, courts held that the contested will or signature 
was not authentic.127 Moreover, empirical evidence from probate court 
reveals that allegations of forgery are relatively common. One of us has 
assembled a dataset of every matter on the probate court’s docket in 
Alameda County, California between January 1, 2009, and December
125. Of course, our research does not support any conclusion about the change of inheritance
forgery over time. It also necessarily excludes the many forged instruments that go undetected
and the countless disputes resolved without litigation or settled before a court rendered a 
decision. Thus, we surmise that the sample of forgery cases collected in this Article represents
only a small fraction of the overall volume of forged inheritance documents.
126. There are also anecdotal reports from outside of the United States that “[w]ill forgery is
not as uncommon as one might think or hope.” Alexander Learmonth, Forgery and Forensics— 
Or, How Not To Forge a Will and Get Away with It, CHANCERY BAR (2016),
https://www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/overseas-seminars/forgery-forensics [https://
perma.cc/PW3R-FBD3]. 
127. A Westlaw search of state and federal court opinions for the prior twenty-year period,
1980–2000, also retrieved numerous will-forgery contests. See, e.g., Sokol v. Moses, 545 So. 2d 950 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (involving party admission of forgery); Dozier v. Smith, 446 So. 2d 1107
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (regarding a will set aside by the trial court but reversed on appeal);
Estate of Jeziorski v. Tomera, 516 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (reversing the trial court’s
dismissal of a forgery claim); In re Shettler Estate, 39 Pa. D. & C.3d 524 (Orphans’ Ct. 1984)
(setting aside a challenged will).
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876 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
31, 2010. In these estates, about 10 percent of will contests—seven out 
of seventy-four—featured forgery claims.128 
Several motifs emerge from will-forgery cases. First, an alarming 
number of cases involve crooked notaries. To give one high-profile
example, Teddy Pendergrass, a platinum-selling R&B singer, died in
Philadelphia in 2010.129 Pendergrass was famous not only for his 
baritone, but also for his grit: after a car accident paralyzed him from
the chest down in 1982, he continued to record and tour.130 Pendergrass 
had apparently executed a will that disinherited his wife and daughters 
and left all of his assets, including his valuable intellectual property
rights, to his son, Teddy, Jr.131 This instrument featured Pendergrass’s
initials, signatures from two witnesses, and a stamp from a notary
public declaring that she had personally supervised the execution 
process.132 It also included a discursive passage in which Pendergrass 
explained his estate plan:  
I have sent my son to college and have prepared him for the day of
my passing. I know him to be a kind and just man . . . . I have also
instructed him that in the event of my death he watch those around
him very closely to see who was real and who was fake. . . . In the days
when the bible was written the father would leave everything to his 
son to take care of the land and this is my wish.133 
128. See David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 2027, 2058, 2061 (2018). 
129. In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Oct. 14, 2014); Tom Huizenga, Teddy Pendergrass Dies at 59, NPR (Jan. 14, 2010, 10:19 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122563163 [https://perma.cc/KMG9-
Q3BE].
 130. See In re Pendergrass, 2014 WL 11201432, at *1.
 131. See id.
 132. See id. at *11.
133. Last Will and Testament of Theodore DeReese Pendergrass at 1–2 (May 24, 2009) (on 
file with authors). 
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 877 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
Figure 6: Excerpts from Teddy Pendergrass’s Alleged Will134 
Ironically, this writing—with its biblical reference and 
condemnation of “fake” people—was itself phony. Teddy, Jr., his 
mother-in-law, and the notary testified under oath that Pendergrass 
had initialed the will in a van outside of the notary’s office on May 24, 
2009.135 But notes from the nurses who cared for Pendergrass 
established that he had not left his house on that date.136 Consequently,
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas held that the proponents of
the will had perjured themselves and that their “entire case was a
fabrication.”137 The court was particularly troubled by the notary’s 
involvement, remarking that “[w]hy [she] would lie under oath is a
mystery.”138 
134. Id. at 1, 4.
 135. In re Pendergrass, 2014 WL 11201432, at *10–12.
 136. Id. at *1–2.
 137. Id. at *15.
 138. Id. For another case involving a dishonest notary, see Estate of Konjolka v. Brown (In re
Estate of Konjolka), No. 1664 WDA 2015, 2017 WL 2704070, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 22, 2017)
(“Conveniently, [the Notary Public’s] notary log was ‘destroyed in a fire’ and he did not produce 
any evidence of payment. The Court finds the loss of the notary log book to be dubious and the 
$100 payment for a single notary act to be extraordinary; thus, [the Notary Public’s] testimony
was questionable.”); see also Vieira v. Vieira, No. CV020172366S, 2004 WL 2361556, at *3, *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2004) (holding a notarized will set aside as a forgery); In re Estate of
Tinley, No. CIV.A. 1318-K, 2001 WL 765177, at *2, *9 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001) (same), aff’d sub 
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878 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
Second, the burden of proof in will-forgery cases remains hazy. As 
noted, the same question—whether the testator signed the will—is 
both part of the proponent’s efforts to show compliance with the Wills 
Act and the core of the contestant’s case.139 Whereas the Wills Act
establishes a bright-line rule for the proponent to prove due execution, 
the contestant’s burden of proof for forgery is neither well-defined nor 
consistently applied. Most states place the onus on the challenger to 
rebut the proponent’s prima facie showing of due execution.140 And
courts usually require the contestant to prove forgery by clear and 
convincing evidence.141 Yet it is unclear exactly what kinds of 
suspicious circumstances suffice to shift the burden back to the 
proponent. For example, in a 1983 Tennessee case, the contestant 
introduced forensic expert testimony that called into question certain
pencil markings on the will.142 Because the will’s physical condition was 
dubious enough “to excite suspicion,” the court held that the 
contestant had rebutted the validity presumption, and that the 
proponent faced “the burden of removing the suspicion or [sic] forgery 
or alteration.”143 More recently, however, another Tennessee appellate 
panel applied the same “excite suspicion” standard to affirm the
nom. Tinley v. Pleasanton, 791 A.2d 751 (Del. 2002) (unpublished table decision); Waters v.
Iverson (In re Estate of Waters), No. 1–13–262, 2014 WL 4402826, at *1 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014)
(same); In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853, 855–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (same). 
139. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
140. See, e.g., Anderton v. Latham, 342 So. 2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1977) (“It is the duty of the 
contestants . . . to offer evidence to satisfy the court that the testator did not sign the
instrument . . . .”); In re Will of DiScala, 500 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (“The objectant
pleaded forgery and has the burden of proof upon this issue.”). In some states, a key distinction
is whether the will has already been admitted to probate when the contestant files her forgery
claim. See Curtis v. Curtis, 481 F.2d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[O]nce a will has been admitted 
to probate, the ultimate burden of persuasion even as to execution rests on the caveator.”);
Succession of Acheé, 229 So. 3d 5, 8 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that the contestant bears the
burden “unless the action was instituted within three months of the date the testament was
probated”); In re Estate of Zerboni, 556 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. App. 2018) (holding that 
contestants “carr[y] the burden of proof on the issue of forgery on [an] already probated will”).
 141. See, e.g., In re Tinley, 2001 WL 765177, at *2; In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217, 1221
(Kan. Ct. App. 2018); Slack v. Truitt, 791 A.2d 129, 133 (Md. 2002); Kita v. Matuszak, 222 N.W.2d
216, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Bryant v. Bryant, 856 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sur. Ct. 2007), 2007 WL
4458189, at *3 (unpublished table decision); In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 967 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003). 
142. Coates v. Thompson, 666 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); see also Haynes v. Mullins,
209 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947) (holding that suspicious circumstances existed when
there was evidence that the witnesses’ names had been added after the will had been submitted 
to probate and the testator’s signature appeared to be traced).
 143. Coates, 666 S.W.2d at 75 (quoting the lower court’s jury instruction) (remanding for a 
new trial because the lower court improperly excluded the proponent’s rebuttal evidence).
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 879 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
probate of a will that misspelled the testator’s name and was riddled
with strange staple holes.144 Despite similar circumstances, the results
were inconsistent. 
Adding to the confusion, there is conflicting authority on whether 
judges can look beyond the instrument’s four corners when ruling on
the threshold question of due execution. For example, in In re Estate 
of Field, which was mentioned in the Introduction, a Kansas appellate
panel held that the proponent did not need to authenticate the 
signatures on the codicil even though she had a history of dishonesty, 
she had created and shredded drafts of the instrument, and the 
witnesses had died in a murder-suicide after being interviewed by the
FBI.145 The court explained that the contestant should bear the burden
of rebutting the validity presumption “where nothing on the face of the
document raises . . . suspicion.”146 In another recent case in New York,
the trial court granted summary judgment upholding a will that, like 
the codicil in Field, appeared on its face to contain all necessary 
signatures.147 But on appeal, the New York Supreme Court Appellate 
Division took the opposite approach to the threshold authentication
rule applied in Field, and reversed based on extrinsic evidence of 
forgery, including proof of “the decedent’s physical inability to execute 
documents before and following the date [she] allegedly executed the 
will.”148 The unsettled scope of judicial review at this threshold stage is 
pivotal because, if suspicious circumstances prevent the proponent 
from establishing due execution, no presumption of validity attaches,
144. In re Estate of Link, 542 S.W.3d 438, 459–60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Haynes, 209
S.W.2d at 279). In Link, the contestants claimed “that multiple sets of staple holes in Ms. Link’s
1998 will, a misspelling of Ms. Link’s name in the attached affidavit, and the fact that Article II of
the will has a subsection ‘A’ and no subsection ‘B’” were “similar indicators of forgery,” 
comparable to those in Haynes, “such that the burden of proof remained on [the alleged forger] 
to remove the suspicion that Ms. Link’s 1998 will was forged.” Id. The Link court disagreed but 
did not explain why Haynes was distinguishable. Id. at 460 (“We disagree. None of those features
‘excites suspicion’ that the will was forged or altered.”).
 145. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1228, 1233–34; see also supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text.
 146. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1224 (emphasis added). The court noted that the Wills Act could 
easily be interpreted to require the proponent “to show the genuineness of [the testator’s] 
signature.” Id. However, the court opted to treat forgery like fraud and undue influence by
assigning the burden to the challenger so long as a document seems to satisfy the execution 
formalities. See id. (“[T]he better practice is to shift to the will contestant the burden of showing 
the invalidity of a competent testator’s signature at the end of a testamentary document witnessed
by two persons.”).
147. In re Estate of Greene, 932 N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (App. Div. 2011). 
148. Id. at 546.
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880 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
and the contestant may be spared the burden of contesting the will 
altogether.
Third, forgery cases hinge on the shaky “science” of forensic 
handwriting analysis. Forensic expert witnesses use techniques such as 
“infra-red light that can reveal whether multiple inks are present on a 
document” and “[h]igh-powered microscopes [that can] detect 
whether a writer stopped and started a lot during a signature.”149 
However, there is no concrete proof that these methods are reliable.150 
In fact, the few studies that exist show that examiners were only able 
to correctly identify whether two exemplars had been written by the 
same person 36 percent of the time.151 Thus, evidence scholars have 
long condemned the judicial practice of qualifying handwriting
specialists as experts based on “little more than their assertions of 
expertise.”152 
Despite these critiques, forgery contestants virtually never prevail 
unless they attack the authenticity of the testator’s signature through 
expert testimony.153 The Alameda County probate records bring this 
point to the fore. For example, the only forgery challenger in the
149. Dale, supra note 101. To be certified by the American Board of Forensic Document
Examiners, an analyst must complete two years of training and learn “how to differentiate
between retouching indicative of forgery and similar markings found in genuine signatures.” AM.
BD. OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAM’RS, OBJECTIVES FOR TRAINING 2, 10 (Oct. 21, 2010),
https://www.abfde.org/htdocs/certification/ObjectivesforTraining.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KAP-
ZMVS].
 150. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of 
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification
“Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738–39 (1989) (“From the perspective of published empirical 
verification, handwriting identification expertise is almost nonexistent.”).
 151. Id. at 747–48. 
152. D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert 
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 65 (1996); see Roger C. Park, 
Signature Identification in the Light of Science and Experience, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1145 (2008)
(“[T]estimony on signature authentication should be admitted, subject to strict procedural
limits.”). Given the vagueness of the field and its guiding principles, it is not surprising that fact
finders are usually forced to choose among dueling and equally plausible conclusions. See, e.g., 
Angelucci v. Aglialoro, No. A-0369-14T2, 2016 WL 854452, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 
7, 2016) (“The judge . . . found that the testimony of plaintiffs’ handwriting expert asserting 
forgery was not more convincing than the divergent opinion of defendant’s expert who found the 
authenticity of [the testator’s] signature to be inconclusive.”). This raises the stakes on how courts
allocate the burdens of proof and persuasion: when evidence of forgery is inconclusive, the party 
who owes these obligations loses.
 153. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rothberg, No. 2391 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 6954970, at *22 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. June 26, 2015) (holding that the contestants failed to prove forgery when they
“produced no expert evidence as to the handwriting of the decedent or the possibility that the 
decedent’s signature . . . was produced by some kind of forgery”).
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 881 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
dataset who lost at trial unwisely attempted to impeach the testator’s 
signature through her own testimony rather than a handwriting 
expert.154 In another case, In re Estate of Epifani,155 the testator
allegedly handwrote a two-page will that featured her name twice: once 
at the beginning of the document and then again at the end.156 Under 
settled California law, either inscription could serve as a “signature.”157 
The contestant’s forensic expert testified that the second signature was
forged, but forgot to mention the first signature.158 Because the 
proponent could point to at least one facially genuine signature that
remained unchallenged by the contestant’s handwriting expert— 
despite evidence that the other signature had been forged—he moved
for summary judgment and obtained a quick settlement.159 
Figure 7: Marina Epifani’s Alleged Will160 
154. See Minutes at 1–2, In re Estate of Morris, No. RP09450940 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2009)
(on file with authors) (summarizing a forgery trial in which both parties called lay witnesses and
the judge ruled that “there is more than sufficient evidence that the will is authentic”).
 155. In re Estate of Epifani, No. RP07327771 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011). 
156. See Last Will and Testament at 1–2, In re Epifani, No. RP07327771 (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Epifani Last Will and Testament].
 157. See, e.g., Cox v. Towle (In re Estate of Williams), 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 44 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that testator’s name written at the top of a holographic will was a “signature”). 
158. See Notice of Motion and Motion of Petitioner Peter Puschnik-Maurer for Summary 
Judgment on Giulia Massari’s Contest of Will at 1–2, In re Epifani, No. RP07327771 (on file with
authors).
 159. See Preliminary Distribution at 1, In re Epifani, No. RP07327771 (on file with authors); 
Petitioner/Respondent’s Settlement Conference Statement at 2–3, In re Epifani, No. RP07327771 
(on file with authors) (arguing that “the [c]ontestant’s own expert has opined under penalty of
perjury that . . . the [d]ecedent wrote her name on the front side of the document”).
 160. Epifani Last Will and Testament, supra note 156, at 1–2.
HORTON & WEISBORD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 4:31 PM         
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     
  
    
  
       
 
    
 
  
     
   
   
   
   
  
  
   
 
    
    
      
   
 
882 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
Fourth, will-forgery litigation can generate enormous expenses
that a prevailing contestant may never recover from a defeated
proponent. Some courts have imposed tort liability for malicious 
prosecution,161 but the cost of pursuing further relief after a successful
lawsuit can easily outweigh the damages recoverable against a 
judgment-proof forger. For example, in In re Estate of Pendergrass,162 
the contestants spent $850,000 in legal fees to set aside the late singer’s 
forged will in probate court.163 These individuals are now suing Teddy,
Jr., the forger, in federal court for wrongful use of civil proceedings,164 
although it remains to be seen whether Teddy, Jr., will have sufficient 
assets to pay damages if he loses. Fee-shifting statutes can also pose
risks to contestants. Recall that in Field, even after FHSU invalidated
the forged codicil, the trial court granted $1 million in attorney fees to 
Oborny, the proponent, upon finding that she had “uttered” the phony
document in “good faith.”165 This award was reversed on appeal, but 
FHSU only narrowly avoided subsidizing Oborny’s lawsuit in addition 
to paying its own legal costs.166 
To conclude, lawmakers and commentators have underestimated 
the frequency of disputes over forged wills. In addition, this lack of 
attention has created several festering areas of doctrinal uncertainty. 
161. See Steiner v. Eikerling, 226 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[P]ersons who 
successfully contest a forged will submitted to probate may maintain an action for malicious
institution of civil proceedings against those who offered the forged document with knowledge of
its falsity.”); First Nat’l Bank of Mayfield v. Gardner, 376 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1964) (recognizing
a cause of action against a party who had forged a codicil).
 162. In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct.
14, 2014).
163. Complaint at 10, Pendergrass v. Pendergrass, No. 2:18-cv-00478-CMR (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6,
2018).
 164. Id. at 11.
 165. In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217, 1234 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). Likewise, in the headline-
grabbing case of business mogul Howard Hughes’s estate, a Nevada jury spent seven months
trying to determine the authenticity of a mysterious will. Jury Finds So Called Mormon Will of
Hughes a Fake, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1978, at A10. The proponent was a stranger who claimed to
have assisted Hughes after finding him lying alone and disoriented in the Utah desert. Id. The
jury, which ultimately found the document to be a forgery, heard “testimony from 69 witnesses,
including 11 handwriting analysts who gave contradictory opinions and saw more than 700 
exhibits and 480 copies of Mr. Hughes’s handwriting.” Id. The litigation proved expensive for
both sides: in addition to the estate’s substantial cost of bringing the contest, the proponent’s
lawyers personally invested $500,000 of their own money to pay for the litigation, which they were
unable to recover. Marlene Adler Marks, Where There’s a Will . . . , NAT’L L.J., Jan. 5, 1981, at 1.
 166. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1235; see also In re Estate of Folcher, 135 A.3d 128, 138 (N.J. 2016) 
(holding that a contestant who prevailed in proving forgery could not recover attorney’s fees from
the forger).
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 883 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
And as is discussed in the next Section, forgery has also spread to other 
legal instruments.  
B. Deeds
Deed forgery has also received little attention from lawmakers 
and commentators. Yet this Section reveals that there has been a surge
of bogus transfers of homes. For example, Table 2 in the Appendix 
presents twenty-nine reported opinions since 2000 in which the true 
owner of real property challenged a deed on forgery grounds.167 
Moreover, reporters across the country have documented dozens of 
additional cases that never find their way into the court system.168 Most 
importantly for the purposes of this Article, these cases and stories 
share a common thread: deed forgers tend to prey on property that is 
owned by a decedent’s estate. 
A primer on real estate transfers can help frame the following 
discussion. Dishonest owners can sell land multiple times to different 
parties. Suppose O deeds Blackacre to A and then again to B. Under 
the ancient doctrine of “prior in time, higher in right,”169 the first taker, 
A, is entitled to the parcel.170 But this would be unjust if B reasonably
relied on O’s false claims of ownership. Thus, to minimize the risk of 
fraud, every jurisdiction has passed a Recording Act.171 These statutes 
establish a local governmental office—the “Deed Register”—where
owners of real property must file deeds.172 By making information
167. In twenty-two of the twenty-nine decisions, courts concluded that the deed was a forgery.
In the remaining seven cases, courts found a triable issue of fact or probable cause on the forgery 
count.
 168. See infra notes 177–79. 
169. Francis S. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, Part I, 93 U. PA.
L. REV. 125, 139 (1944). 
170. See, e.g., Taylor Mattis, Recording Acts: Anachronistic Reliance, 25 REAL PROP., PROB.
& TR. J. 17, 19 (1990). 
171. See, e.g., ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 259 (5th ed. 2017). Recording Acts were
also designed to replace the antiquated land-transfer process known as “livery of seisin.”
Philbrick, supra note 169, at 137–39 (providing historical context for the emergence of alternative
legal processes for conveying property unassociated with “ceremony”). The first Recording Act
in America was passed in Massachusetts in 1640. See RUFFORD G. PATTON & CARROLL G.
PATTON, PATTON ON LAND TITLES § 8 & n.95 (2d ed. 1957).
172. Whether Recording Acts impose a mandatory duty to file deeds, mortgages, and other
similar instruments remains unclear. Compare Union Cty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 735 F.3d 730,
733–34 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Recording is a valuable service, provided usually for a modest fee—but 
provided only to those who think the service worth the fee.”), with Montgomery Cty. v.
MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“We predict that the Pennsylvania
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884 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
about ownership publicly available, Recording Acts “prevent persons 
owning lands from selling them more than once.”173 
In the last decade, a growing number of con artists realized that a 
system designed to discourage fraud by landowners actually facilitates 
fraud against landowners. To cloak one’s self with apparent ownership, 
one must simply record a fake deed, a step that is shockingly easy. 
Other than a cursory review to determine whether a deed seems to 
satisfy the “essential elements” of a conveyance—usually the grantor’s 
signature and sometimes approval by a notary174—the overwhelming
majority of Deed Registers do not try to authenticate legal 
instruments.175 In fact, because Deed Register clerks are merely
“ministerial officers,” many states expressly prohibit them from
“pass[ing] upon the validity” of deeds that seem superficially valid.176 
Supreme Court would conclude that the statute does make recording of conveyances
compulsory . . . .”). 
173. Fox v. Sizeland, 9 N.Y.S.2d 350, 360 (Sup. Ct. 1938); see also Jackson v. Post, 15 Wend.
588, 594 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (“The object of the [R]ecording [A]cts is to prevent frauds—to
prevent the person having title to land from selling it more than once, and thereby defrauding one
or more of the purchasers.”). Recording Acts also accomplish other objectives, such as allowing
“public officials such as tax collectors[] to ascertain apparent ownership of land.” Corwin W.
Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IOWA L. REV. 231, 231 (1962).
 174. See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 473 S.E.2d 760, 762 (Ga. 1996) (“Among the essential elements
of a deed are a written instrument, description identifying the land, [and the] grantor’s
signature . . . .”); Celtic Corp. v. Tinnea, 254 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (listing similar
“essential elements of a deed” (quoting Gregg v. Georgacopoulos, 990 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999))). 
175. See Eli Segall, Woman Claims Ownership of Dead Woman’s House in Las Vegas, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Mar. 3, 2018, 11:10 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/ 
housing/woman-claims-ownership-of-dead-womans-house-in-las-vegas [https://perma.cc/WJ5D-
WMWA] (noting that in Clark County, Nevada, the recorder’s office is “not required to check
the documents’ veracity”).
176. Dancy v. Clark, 24 App. D.C. 487, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1905); see also Woodward v. Bowers,
630 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (“[T]he statutes . . . mandat[e] that the Recorder record
all deeds . . . that are properly acknowledged, regardless of their contents or validity.”); Smith v.
Cty. of Alameda, No. A149228, 2017 WL 5591467, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2017) (“[A] 
county recorder may not refuse to record an instrument ‘on the basis of its lack of legal
sufficiency.’” (quoting Smith v. Cty. of Alameda, No A142436, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2297, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015))); Sacerdotte v. Duralde, 1 La. 482, 486 (1830) (“The 
recorder . . . has no discretion to exercise as to the validity or effect of the acts recorded.”); Ondra
v. Bardella, No. 2012-7441, 2013 WL 10545384, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 16, 2013) (holding
that a deed recorder lacked “discretion to reject documents based on their perceived legal
deficiency, and ‘is truly just a “custodian” of documents’”); Bionomic Church of R.I. v. Gerardi,
414 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 1980) (“[A] recorder of deeds is a purely ministerial officer who, when
presented with a deed executed in compliance with controlling statutes, must receive and record
the instrument.”). But see State ex rel. Data Trace Info. Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal
Officer, 963 N.E.2d 1288, 1296 (Ohio 2012) (“[C]ounty recorders, within their discretion, [may]
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 885 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
The upside of this system is that deeds can be recorded quickly. The 
downside is that “anyone can file papers . . . to take ownership of a 
house.”177 To exploit this practice, wrongdoers began to record fake 
deeds and then sell the stolen properties.178 
The main obstacle to this scheme was not legal; it was practical.
Although it was easy to obtain a fraudulent title, it was harder to
convince would-be purchasers that stolen property was primed for sale;
most buyers want to see a residence before purchasing it. However, 
forgers cannot gain entry to occupied homes without trespassing on the 
property or arousing the owner’s suspicion. Thus, deed fraud
flourished during the foreclosure crisis, when forgers preyed upon the 
vast inventory of abandoned houses.179 
When the real estate market recovered, forgers discovered 
another soft target: vacant real estate owned by the recently 
deceased.180 Forgers learned to exploit the typical delay that 
accompanies the transfer of inherited property from the dead to the 
living. Land often must march through probate, which can take several 
years.181 In addition, heirs and beneficiaries frequently live far away
and cannot actively monitor the parcel. In turn, when a house is vacant 
and unattended, neither the counterfeit deed nor the trespasser is likely 
‘refuse to record an instrument of writing [if] . . . the recorder has reasonable cause to believe the
instrument is materially false or fraudulent.’” (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 317.13(B)).
 177. Segall, supra note 175; see also Lise Olsen, Homes Illegally Taken and Sold in Scam, 
HOUS. CHRON. (May 9, 2011, 5:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-
texas/article/Homes-illegally-taken-and-sold-in-scam-1619420.php [https://perma.cc/T23W-
CETJ] (“In Texas, anyone can file a property transfer record or ownership claim without 
providing ID or other proof.”).
 178. See, e.g., Chris Stewart, Prosecutor: Local Man Stole Homes from the Old—And the
Dead, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (July 2, 2018 9:46 PM), https://www.daytondailynews.com/ 
news/prosecutor-local-man-stole-homes-from-the-old-and-the-dead/Ll1ddRQRyBAXZwMULj 
TrFL [https://perma.cc/D63A-QC2P] (explaining that after a con artist “had established
‘ownership’ of the subject properties, he would then try to sell those properties to unsuspecting
buyers”). 
179. See Susan Taylor Martin, Housing Scam: Rise of Fraudulent Deeds Throws Wrench into
Home Ownership, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.tampabay.com/news/ 
business/realestate/Housing-scam-Rise-of-fraudulent-deeds-throws-wrench-into-home-
ownership_162676364 [https://perma.cc/3EPQ-ZXT5] (“Typically, deed scams occur with houses
that are unoccupied because they are in foreclosure or the owner has died.”).
 180. See id.; Manhattan Grand Jury Report, supra note 50, at 7–8 (“A fraudster can identify 
vulnerable properties in various ways, for example, by scouring obituaries for recently deceased
owners . . . .”).
 181. See, e.g., David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County,
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 648 (2015) (finding that the mean length of a probate case in one 
California county was 507 days).
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886 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
to be detected right away. This is partly because any notice sent to the
vacant property is more likely to be intercepted by the forger than the 
estate’s fiduciary. Moreover, although prospective purchasers can 
protect themselves against title theft by checking the Deed Register, 
existing owners usually assume they have no reason to investigate title
to their own property. In fact, throughout the last decade, the media
have reported a rash of counterfeit deeds of land owned by decedents 
in Boston,182 Dayton,183 Denver,184 Detroit,185 Houston,186 Kansas
City,187 Las Vegas,188 Miami,189 and Tampa.190 
Although local authorities have taken countermeasures, estate-
related deed fraud has proven resilient. Some cities and counties have 
created notification systems that send owners a letter, text, or email “in 
the event that one or more [deed-related documents] has been
recorded against [their] property.”191 However, these programs are
182. See Collin Binkley, Former MIT Prof Who Staged Shooting Now Accused of Forgery, 
BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2017/12/28/former-mit-
prof-who-staged-shooting-now-accused-of-forgery [https://perma.cc/44V4-NE8K].
 183. See Stewart, supra note 178. 
184. See David Olinger, Denver Judge Finds Fraud in Sale of Dead Man’s House, DENV. POST
(Aug. 29, 2013, 11:43 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2013/08/29/denver-judge-finds-fraud-in-
sale-of-dead-mans-house [https://perma.cc/2GM3-VJWS].
 185. See Eric. D. Lawrence, Pair To Be Sentenced in Fake-Property Sales Scam, DET. FREE
PRESS (Mar. 24, 2016, 7:53 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/ 
detroit/2016/03/24/pair-guilty-mortgage-scam-detroit/82208454 [https://perma.cc/95WN-NND5]. 
186. See Olsen, supra note 177.
 187. See Ryan Kath, Prompted by 41 Action News Investigation, Missouri Lawmakers Try To
Prevent Real Estate Fraud, 41 KSHB KAN. CITY (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:39 PM), 
https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/investigations/investigation-uncovers-apparent-real-
estate-scheme-including-forged-signatures-of-dead-people?page=2 [https://perma.cc/R6RM-
MVLS].
 188. See Segall, supra note 175.
 189. See Anne Geggis & Wayne K. Roustan, Seven Accused of Taking Homes Worth $12 
Million from the Living and the Dead, SUN-SENTINEL (May 9, 2018, 5:35 PM), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-sb-operation-tomb-raider-broward-20180509-story.html [https://
perma.cc/W5NV-HRSD].
 190. See Martin, supra note 179.
 191. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES, tit. 19 § 43-02(b) (2018); see also Erik Larsen, Ocean County Clerk 
Combats Mortgage Fraudsters and Other Real Estate Swindlers, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Aug. 25, 
2018, 9:16 PM), https://www.app.com/story/news/local/ocean-county/government/2018/08/25/
ocean-county-clerk-combats-mortgage-fraudsters-and-land-swindlers/1099411002 [https://
perma.cc/U48S-HA2U] (profiling a county official “encouraging property owners . . . to sign up
for free automated email alerts”); Lisa Parker, Loophole Helps Criminals File Fraudulent Deeds, 
NBC CHI. (Nov. 20, 2013, 6:50 AM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Loophole-Helps-
Criminals-File-Fraudulent-Deeds-232444821.html [https://perma.cc/V2K8-MYUG] (“Cook and
DuPage [counties] now offer a free property fraud alert system, which notifies a registered
homeowner if any activity is recorded on their property account.”); Stewart, supra note 178 
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 887 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
voluntary, and, from the limited publicly available data, it appears that 
enrollment has been low. For example, in the two years since
Hillsborough County, Florida, adopted such a regime, only 2,167 of the 
region’s 590,779 residential properties have opted in.192 Moreover, 
these alerts do little to discourage deed forgeries that are recorded after 
the owner’s death. The parties who need to know about a new filing 
against estate-owned property—the decedent’s personal
representative and successors-in-interest—are unlikely to receive
warnings sent by email or text to the decedent. Consequently, despite 
New York City’s notification system, police still received 755 
complaints about deed forgery—often involving owners who are “dead 
and appear[] to have no heirs”—in one recent ten-month span.193 In 
South Florida, forged conveyances are so often linked to estates that 
the sheriff’s office dubbed its efforts to combat deed fraud “Operation 
Tomb Raider.”194 
Counterfeit deeds can inflict serious harm on a deceased owner’s 
heirs or beneficiaries. To be sure, these instruments are absolutely
void, so a victim can recover title even from legitimate downstream 
purchasers.195 But untangling these legal knots can be time-consuming
and expensive. Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal fees alone can 
range up to $100,000.196 And in yet another aspect of financial harm 
(“Those enrolling [in the Fraud Alert Notification System] can opt to receive an email, a letter or
both whenever a deed, a mortgage or a lien is filed on parcels enrolled . . . .”).
 192. Martin, supra note 179. For statistics on the county’s housing stock, see QuickFacts,
Hillsborough County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/hillsboroughcountyflorida/PST120217 [https://perma.cc/DB6R-NX89]. 
193. James Fanelli & Gustavo Solis, Family Says Its $1.5 Million Brownstone Was Stolen in
Deed-Theft Scam, DNAINFO (May 12, 2015, 7:35 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20150512/hamilton-heights/family-says-their-15-million-brownstone-was-stolen-deed-theft-
scam [https://perma.cc/7NLL-9QS6].
194. Geggis & Roustan, supra note 189. 
195. See, e.g., Wutzke v. Bill Reid Painting Serv., Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (Ct. App. 1984)
(“It has been uniformly established that a forged document is void ab initio and constitutes a 
nullity . . . .”); Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Veatch, 710 S.E.2d 744, 745 (Ga. 2011) (“[A] forged
deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee.” (alternation in original) (quoting Brock v. Yale
Mortg. Corp., 700 S.E.2d 583, 586 (Ga. 2010)); Faison v. Lewis, 32 N.E.3d 400, 403 (N.Y. 2015)
(noting that a forged deed “holds a unique position in the law; a legal nullity at its creation is
never entitled to legal effect because ‘[v]oid things are as no things’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Marden v. Dorthy, 54 N.E. 726, 731 (N.Y. 1899))). 
196. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text (describing a deed forgery in New York
where the heir ended up paying $100,000 in attorneys’ expenses); cf. Manhattan Grand Jury
Report, supra note 50, at 31 (“[R]eclaiming residential real estate is complex, can take several
years, and can be prohibitively expensive.”); Stewart, supra note 178 (estimating that the cost
could range from $2,500 to $3,000 in simple matters).
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suffered by heirs and beneficiaries, the burden of proof in deed-forgery
cases contributes to the high cost of title recovery. When a deed is
accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment—a simple paragraph 
that is often signed by a notary197—courts presume due execution,
meaning a contestant must prove forgery by clear and convincing
evidence.198 As one court explained, “[a] certificate of acknowledgment
should not be overthrown upon evidence of a doubtful character, . . .
but only on proof so clear and convincing as to amount to a moral 
certainty.”199 This rule favors forgers by setting a low threshold for 
obtaining this validity presumption and imposing a high bar on
contestants to prove forgery. This asymmetrical burden may encourage 
contestants to settle meritorious but difficult-to-prove deed contests by 
paying off the forger.200 If nothing else, it makes litigation more
expensive. Given the fact that we unearthed no baseless challenges to
deeds, it is unclear why the law should impose such a demanding 
standard. 
Making matters worse, defrauded individuals can rarely recover
for other losses arising from the forger’s misconduct. For example,
recall the plight of Jennifer Merin, which was mentioned in the 
Introduction.201 Although Merin was ultimately able to evict Darrell 
Beatty—the man who had forged the deed to the house she inherited— 
she incurred thousands of dollars in property damage.202 She sued the 
City of New York for negligence.203 Unfortunately, the state trial court
dismissed her complaint because the Register could not have rejected 
197. A certificate of acknowledgement is much like a will’s attestation clause or self-proving
affidavit. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 309-a (McKinney 2019); see also supra note 84 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 256–59 and accompanying text (describing the certificate’s
legitimation purposes).
 198. See, e.g., In re Estate of Romano, 801 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sur. Ct. June 29, 2005), 2005 WL
1553927, at *11 (unpublished table decision) (“[A] certificate of acknowledgment attached to a
deed raises a presumption of due execution which can only be overcome with clear and convincing
evidence.”).
199. Osborne v. Zornberg, 792 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Albany Cty. Sav.
Bank v. McCarty, 43 N.E. 427, 430 (N.Y. 1896)). 
200. See Manhattan Grand Jury Report, supra note 50, at 9 (“Some diabolical criminals even
commenced lawsuits against the legitimate owners, using it as an opportunity to extort payment
from them in exchange for the return of the deed.”). 
201. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
 202. See Merin Opposition Brief, supra note 18, at 6 (describing property damage including a 
broken garage door, a missing car, and personal items broken in a pile).
 203. See Merin v. City of New York, No. 713069/15, 2016 WL 3454185, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 12, 2016) (providing relevant procedural history).
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 889 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
Beatty’s bogus deed under the “ministerial function” doctrine noted
above.204 
In sum, homes owned by decedents are easy prey for deed forgery 
schemes that exploit the lack of authentication protocols among Deed
Registers and the limited ability of absentee fiduciaries to monitor 
estate-owned property. As the following Section discusses, similar 
problems have emerged in the realm of life insurance.  
C. Life Insurance Beneficiary Designations 
The life insurance industry has grown exponentially since the 
dawn of the nonprobate revolution.205 But as this Section explains, the 
most important component of life insurance policies—beneficiary 
designations—are especially prone to forgery.
Courts have routinely presided over claims that a life insurance 
form was falsified or fabricated. There have been at least twenty-one
reported decisions on the topic since 2000. These opinions, which 
appear in Table 3 of our Appendix, reveal that in thirteen cases, courts 
either held that a beneficiary designation was counterfeit or found
enough evidence to submit the allegation to the trier of fact. 
Counterintuitively, life insurers face little pressure to deter
forgery. Firms exploit two loopholes to avoid being penalized when
they honor bogus beneficiary designations. The first are the rules of 
interpleading: the process by which a neutral third party, such as a bank
or insurance company, is in possession of property and sues to compel 
the property’s adverse claimants to resolve their conflict.206 Because
the “disinterested stakeholder”—the litigant who files an interpleader
action—helps bring the matter to an efficient close, it can recover its
attorneys’ fees and costs.207 When a life insurance company learns 
about forgery allegations before it has made any payments, it simply 
204. Id. 
205. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2018) (providing the procedural obligations for interpleader); FED.
R. CIV. P. 22 (same). 
207. Stonebridge Life Ins. v. Kissinger, 89 F. Supp. 3d 622, 627 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Metro.
Life Ins. v. Kubicheck, 83 F. App’x 425, 431 (3d Cir. 2003)); Banner Life Ins. v. Lukacin, Civ. A.
No. 13-cv-6589 (CCC), 2014 WL 4724902, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 2014); see also Pan-Am. Life Ins. 
of Am. v. Pinto, No. 05-22969-CIV, 2008 WL 2627708, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2008) (“[C]osts and 
attorneys’ fees are generally awarded, in the discretion of the court, to the plaintiff who initiates
the interpleader as a mere disinterested stake holder.”).
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initiates an interpleader action, deposits the proceeds into the court, 
bows out of the case, and usually gets reimbursed for its efforts.208 
Second, when an insurer receives notice about a forgery claim after
it has paid the death benefit, it can invoke a “facility of payment” 
statute.209 Facility-of-payment legislation shields insurers from
damages so long as they both acted in good faith and released funds to 
the beneficiaries who are named on the policy.210 These laws are
designed to spare companies from a laborious investigation into 
whether their customers were competent or were unduly influenced
when they changed beneficiaries.211 Although insurers can often spot
inauthentic signatures with relative ease, many courts have extended 
facility-of-payment statutes to allegations of forgery.212 In this double-
barreled way, insurers have insulated themselves from the
consequences of being duped. 
In fact, both the impleader rules and facility-of-payment statutes 
create perverse incentives for insurers to avoid scrutinizing death-
beneficiary designations. In an impleader proceeding, the stakeholder 
208. See, e.g., Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Sampson, 556 F.3d 6, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court’s award of almost $16,000 in litigation costs to life insurance company in
interpleader action); Life Ins. of N. Am. v. Eufracio, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1185 (N.D. Iowa 2014)
(awarding life insurance company about $4,700); N.Y. Life Ins. & Annuity Corp. v. Esfandiari,
No. 10-00007 ACK–BMK, 2010 WL 3260248, at *4 (D. Haw. Aug. 13, 2010) (awarding life 
insurance company about $9,000); Farmers New World Life Ins. v. Rees, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678,
685, 689 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming trial court’s award of about $8,000). Admittedly, insurers do
not always recover their litigation expenses. See infra Part III.C (describing the shortcomings of 
a beneficiary designation). 
209. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-24 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2721 (2018); FLA.
STAT. § 627.423 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 41-1828 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-260 (West
2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:877 (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2425 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-15-501 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-18-26 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3626 (2018); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3712 (2018); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-22 (2018).
 210. See, e.g., Fortis Benefits Ins. v. Pinkley, 926 So. 2d 981, 984–85 (Ala. 2005) (discussing
the purposes and common law underpinning of facility-of-payment legislation).
 211. See, e.g., 4 STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS, COUCH ON
INSURANCE 3d § 60:77 (rev. ed. 2011) (“[T]he insurer is not under any duty to investigate the
mental competency of the insured [or] . . . whether a change of beneficiary had been procured by
undue influence in the absence of knowledge of facts that would indicate that the change might
have been so procured.”).
 212. See, e.g., Fortis Benefits Ins., 926 So. 2d at 989 (holding that insurer has no “duty to
investigate and discover whether a change of beneficiary has been procured by forgery”);
Schwartz v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 73 So. 3d 798, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[O]ur 
statute . . . does not impose a duty on the insurer to investigate whether a change of owner or
beneficiary has been procured by forgery.”); McNabb v. Ky. Cent. Life Ins., 631 S.W.2d 253, 255 
(Tex. App. 1982) (“The insurer is not under any duty to determine whether the change of
beneficiary was procured or induced by improper means where it has no reason to believe or
know that such was the case.”).
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 891 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
is typically not entitled to attorney’s fees if she is responsible for the 
dispute between the interested parties.213 One way an insurer can 
minimize its culpability for causing a forgery contest is to remain
ignorant of a beneficiary designation’s true signature.214 Likewise,
under facility-of-payment statutes, one element of this defense is the
insurer’s good faith—the fact that the company “has no reason to
believe or know” that something about the beneficiary designation is 
awry.215 Thus, the less an insurer learns, the more reasonable its 
reliance on a forged designation will seem in hindsight.216 
As a result, these companies have only made hollow gestures 
toward discouraging forgery. Although insurance policies are 
contracts, and therefore not always publicly available, we were able to 
gather thirteen beneficiary-designation forms from court filings and 
213. See, e.g., United Bank of Denver v. Oxford Props., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 755, 757 (D. Colo.
1988) (“Courts traditionally have refused to award costs and counsel fees to a stakeholder who is
in some way culpable as regards the subject matter of the interpleader proceeding, but not
sufficiently culpable to warrant denial of interpleader altogether.”).
 214. Cf. Demerath v. Knights of Columbus, 680 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Neb. 2004) (holding that an
insurance company did not need to investigate whether an attorney-in-fact had the authority to
alter a beneficiary designation when it had no “knowledge of facts reasonably suggesting the
change was improper”).
 215. Schwartz, 73 So. 3d at 807. 
216. In beneficiary-designation disputes, courts often defer to rather than regulate the life
insurance carrier’s designation procedures. For instance, in Maddox v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 
No. 04-73478, 2006 WL 1235177 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2006), the life insurance benefit manager had 
“changed its procedures . . . to allow oral changes to the designation of beneficiaries.” Id. at *1
n.2. Seventeen days before the insured’s death, a companion who had been living with the insured
for about six months called the benefit manager from the insured’s hospital room to request a 
beneficiary change. Id. at *1. Both the companion and the insured participated on the call in which
they removed the insured’s three sons from the policy and, instead, named the companion as the 
sole death beneficiary. Id. In court, the sons argued that the insured “was gravely ill at the time
of the change of beneficiary” and that “the telephone call’s transcript indicates that [the 
companion] was doing the overwhelming amount of the talking to the [insurance carrier’s] 
representative.” Id. at *2. Citing compliance with the benefit manager’s change-of-beneficiary
procedures, the court rejected the sons’ undue influence contest because the insurer’s payment to
the companion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id. at *3. 
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892 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
the internet.217 These forms reveal that insurers have adopted protocols 
that only create the illusion of security.218 
For one, insurers have haphazardly borrowed principles from the 
law of will execution. As mentioned earlier, the Wills Act requires 
testamentary instruments to be written, signed by the testator, and 
attested by two people who were present at the same time when the
testator signed or acknowledged the document.219 Most states also have 
“purging” statutes, which require interested witnesses to forfeit any 
benefit that they take under the will.220 In the realm of life insurance,
217. See BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION FORM, AAA LIFE INS. CO. [hereinafter AAA FORM],
https://www.aaalife.com/binaries/content/assets/pdf/aaa-life—-beneficiary-designation-form.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AU3A-RYNN]; CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY, AM. INT’L GRP., INC. [hereinafter
AIG FORM], https://www.aig.com/content/dam/aig/america-canada/us/documents/individual/life/
aglc0108-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4PW-XL2Q]; BENEFICIARY CHANGE REQUEST, AM.
NAT’L [hereinafter AM. NAT’L FORM], https://www.americannational.com/wps/wcm/connect/
americannational/d0ce760f-7b6a-48f1-ac61-97908c16b5f3/Beneficiary+Change+Request+Form+
AN-11088.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/6TLB-G8QJ]; BENEFICIARY CHANGE
REQUEST, CHESAPEAKE LIFE INS. CO. (2008 version) [hereinafter 2008 CHESAPEAKE FORM] (on
file with authors); CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY FORM, COLONIAL LIFE [hereinafter COLONIAL
LIFE FORM], https://www.coloniallife.com/en/-/media/Main/PDFs/Service-Forms/change-of-
beneficiary-form-17075.ashx [https://perma.cc/Z395-N3UV]; BENEFICIARY CHANGE FOR LIFE
POLICY, LINCOLN FIN. GRP. [hereinafter LINCOLN FORM], https://www.lfg.com/pbl-forms-
service-app/rest/forms/getDocument/8713/CS06893 [https://perma.cc/95DG-XXFD];
INDIVIDUAL OWNER & BENEFICIARY CHANGE REQUEST, MASSMUTUAL [hereinafter
MASSMUTUAL FORM], https://www.massmutual.com/efiles/life/pdfs/fr2255.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WSG2-KBSH]; LIFE INSURANCE CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY – SHORT FORM,
METRO. LIFE INS. CO. [hereinafter METLIFE FORM],
https://eforms.metlife.com/wcm8/PDFFiles/55783.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q226-6EES];
APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION, NATIONWIDE [hereinafter
NATIONWIDE FORM], https://nationwidefinancial.com/media/pdf/LAF-0119AO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DPS8-C3FX]; OWNERSHIP/BENEFICIARY CHANGE FORM FOR NEW YORK 
LIFE ANNUITIES, N.Y. LIFE, [hereinafter N.Y. LIFE FORM], 
http://www.nylinvestments.com/polos/OwnershipBeneficiary_Change_Form_For_New_York_L 
ife_Annuities.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4W9-6AFL]; REQUEST TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY ON LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES, PRUDENTIAL [hereinafter PRUDENTIAL FORM],
https://www.accuquote.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/PRU_COB-Only.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9J4Z-S7NW].
218. In the related context of retirement accounts, scholars have noted that financial
institutions unwisely “rel[y] on the attentiveness and comprehension of lay accountholders
confronted with often counterintuitive forms thrust in front of them by institutions with little 
incentive (and no obligation) to clarify or explain those forms.” Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B.
Leslie, Accidental Inheritance: Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 165, 212 (2014). 
219. See supra notes 69–71. 
220. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.2(a) (McKinney 2018) (codifying such 
witness abrogations, subject to additional limitations). But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505(b)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (amended 2010) (“The signing of a will by an interested witness does
not invalidate the will or any provision of it.”).
HORTON & WEISBORD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 4:31 PM         
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        
 
    
     
   
  
   
      
      
   
   
 
  
        
  
      
  
  
     
   
    
  
 893 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
only Massachusetts has even partially replicated these rules by 
mandating that “a disinterested person” subscribe these beneficiary
designations.221 Consequently, insurers are largely free to construct 
their own formalities, and many use only the bare minimum. For 
example, although Massachusetts companies insist that policyholders 
sign their forms,222 they generally do not require attestation. Some
beneficiary designations contain a space for a witness’s signature but 
also instruct policyholders that only Massachusetts residents need to
take this step.223 Other forms do not even contain a line for witnesses 
to put pen to paper.224 Bizarrely, one company, Chesapeake Life, states 
in bold type that any witness must “NOT [be] a relative.”225 This
requirement misapplies the purging doctrine by prohibiting related
rather than interested witnesses: after all, not all beneficiaries are 
relatives and not all relatives are beneficiaries.  
Some companies also require the signature of any “irrevocable 
beneficiary.” An irrevocable beneficiary is a person whose interest 
“cannot be divested without [her] consent.”226 Given this definition, it 
is not surprising that several insurers ask existing irrevocable
beneficiaries to sign—and thereby assent to—forms that remove their 
name from the policy.227 Yet a handful of firms also demand that 
irrevocable beneficiaries sign in order to be added to the policy.228 This
221. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 123 (2018); see also Cannon v. Cannon, 868 N.E.2d 636, 641 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (noting that the statute “has an obvious purpose of preventing fraud in the 
designation of beneficiaries”).
 222. See, e.g., AAA FORM, supra note 217, at 1; AIG FORM, supra note 217, at 2; AM. NAT’L 
FORM, supra note 217, at 1; COLONIAL LIFE FORM, supra note 217, at 1; LINCOLN FORM, supra 
note 217, at 1; MASSMUTUAL FORM, supra note 217, at 7; METLIFE FORM, supra note 217, at 3; 
PRUDENTIAL FORM, supra note 217, at 3.
 223. See, e.g., MASSMUTUAL FORM, supra note 217, at 7; NATIONWIDE FORM, supra note 
217, at 4–5; N.Y. LIFE FORM, supra note 217, at 3; PRUDENTIAL FORM, supra note 217, at 3.
 224. See, e.g., AAA FORM, supra note 217; AM. NAT’L FORM, supra note 217; COLONIAL LIFE
FORM, supra note 217; LINCOLN FORM, supra note 217. Some of these forms might pertain to
group insurance policies, which are exempt from the Massachusetts statute. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 123. But even if attestation is not legally necessary, insurers could voluntarily
adopt this extra safeguard.
 225. 2008 CHESAPEAKE FORM, supra note 217, at 2. This version of the form was in effect in
2008. As we mention infra note 228, the company amended it in 2015. 
226. Kliamovich v. Kliamovich, 925 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (App. Div. 2011).
 227. See, e.g., METLIFE FORM, supra note 217, at 3 (“If an irrevocable Beneficiary was
previously named, they must sign and date below.”). 
228. See, e.g., AIG FORM, supra note 217, at 2–3 (noting that the request must be signed by
an irrevocable beneficiary). American National’s form confusingly states that “[i]f an irrevocable
beneficiary exists on a policy, that person must sign.” AM. NAT’L FORM, supra note 217, at 7. This
instruction does not specify whether the person who must sign is the one being added to the policy 
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stipulation is both unnecessary and unwise. Nobody needs to agree to 
become a beneficiary. In fact, anyone who does not want to collect 
insurance proceeds can simply disclaim them.229 Moreover, this 
mandate increases the potential for wrongdoing by inserting parties 
who stand to gain from a beneficiary designation into the process of 
executing it. Notably, in other contexts, the law discourages this very
arrangement: purging statutes force interested witnesses to disgorge 
their inheritances,230 and the doctrine of undue influence considers an
alleged wrongdoer’s active involvement in creating a donative
instrument as a suspicious circumstance.231 Thus, soliciting a signature 
from a prospective irrevocable beneficiary invites trouble. 
Finally, some insurers ask a customer to enclose a copy of their 
policy along with the change-of-beneficiary form.232 The idea seems to 
be that only the insured has possession of the underlying contract.
However, this precaution adds nothing in the common scenario in
which a forger lives with the victim or otherwise has access to her
important documents, including documents bearing the victim’s 
signature. For example, in Chesapeake Life Insurance v. Parker,233 
which was discussed in the Introduction, a company’s submit-the-
policy mandate did not stop the decedent’s sister, who was caring for 
him and thus probably had access to the policy, from faking his 
signature.234 Moreover, firms impose this mandate with one hand and
then void it with the other. For example, Nationwide’s beneficiary 
designation “waives any policy provision requiring the return of the 
[p]olicy to the [c]ompany,”235 and Prudential’s states that, by signing 
or the one who is being removed. Likewise, in 2015, Chesapeake Life began requiring the
signature of an “irrevocable beneficiary” without elaborating whether this means an old or new
beneficiary. BENEFICIARY CHANGE REQUEST, CHESAPEAKE LIFE INS. CO. 2 (2015 version)
[hereinafter 2015 CHESAPEAKE FORM] (on file with authors). 
229. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105(a) (amended 2010) (“A person may disclaim,
in whole or part, any interest in or power over property . . . .”).
 230. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.  
231. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt.
h (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“In evaluating whether suspicious circumstances are present, all relevant
factors may be considered, including . . . the extent to which the alleged wrongdoer participated
in the preparation or procurement of the will or will substitute . . . .”).
 232. See, e.g., 2015 CHESAPEAKE FORM, supra note 228, at 2.
233. Chesapeake Life Ins. v. Parker, No. 18-C-643, 2018 WL 4188469 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31,
2018). 
234. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
235. NATIONWIDE FORM, supra note 217, at 3.
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the form, the insured “certif[ies] that the policy(ies) is/are in [her]
possession.”236 Accordingly, this protection is also largely hollow.
To conclude, life insurance companies have virtually no incentive
to deter forged beneficiary designations. As a result, they have adopted
formalities that range from the merely toothless to the downright 
counterproductive. 
III. NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS
In light of the prevalence of inheritance forgeries established 
above, this Part proposes ways to strengthen inheritance law’s 
protections against forgery. For wills, this Part critiques execution 
formalities that pose a heightened risk of forgery and suggests new 
burden-shifting rules that would make it easier for contestants to prove 
forgery in court. For deeds, it suggests enhancing the authentication 
protocols of Deed Registers. And for beneficiary designations, it 
proposes that life insurance companies should bear more responsibility 
for deterring forgery. 
A. Wills 
1. Execution. As noted, the law of will execution has been in flux.
Inspired by the UPC, several states have either adopted the harmless 
error rule, allowed notarization instead of attestation, abolished
purging statutes, or authorized electronic wills.237 This Section argues 
that the prevalence of inheritance forgery raises fresh questions about 
some of these changes. 
The boldest of these developments—the harmless error rule— 
likely has little impact on forgery.238 As mentioned, the harmless error 
doctrine allows courts to validate a writing that does not comply with 
the Wills Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that the testator 
intended it to be her will.239 It seems highly unlikely that a forger would 
create a fake will that violates the Wills Act and then subject the
forgery to a litigated will contest. The harmless error rule’s heightened 
scrutiny would bring unwanted attention to any suspicious
236. PRUDENTIAL FORM, supra note 217, at 3.
 237. See supra Part I. 
238. Harmless error is “the most significant change in what constitutes a will since [the]
enactment of the Statute of Frauds.” Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform
Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1994).
 239. See supra note 105.
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896 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
circumstances surrounding the document’s execution. Our findings 
support this hypothesis: nearly all wills in the cases we reviewed either 
were purportedly signed by witnesses or seemed to satisfy the 
requirements for a holographic will.240 At bottom, then, the harmless 
error rule seems to neither weaken nor enhance inheritance law’s 
regulation of will forgery. 
The data also suggest that the abolition of purging statutes is a
relatively risk-free step from a forgery perspective. In our review of 
cases, none of the wills set aside on forgery grounds was signed by a 
witness who also claimed to be a beneficiary.241 Again, this makes 
sense: it is not clear why a wrongdoer would go out of her way to call
attention to a forgery by embroiling herself in a fraudulent execution 
process. 
More controversially, relaxation of the handwriting requirement
for holographic wills also seems benign. Commentators who are 
skeptical of holographic wills have questioned whether handwritten
but unattested instruments provide “sufficient protection against 
forgery.”242 Other critics have gone further and asserted that “[m]ost 
bogus [(forged)] wills are holographic.”243 In stark contrast, we found
only two decisions that held that a holographic will was forged.244 This
supports the conventional justification for allowing the testator’s 
handwriting to serve as a substitute for witnesses, which is the idea that
“a successful counterfeit of another’s handwriting is exceedingly 
difficult.”245 Apparently, despite the questionable reliability of forensic 
handwriting analysis, forgers remain sufficiently concerned about the
possibility of detection to prefer typewritten forgeries that require
handwritten fabrication of only the decedent’s signature. 
However, we are less sanguine about notarized wills. Scholars 
have argued that attestation fails to prevent fraud because wrongdoers
usually know enough about Wills Act formalities to procure or
240. See infra Appendix tbl.1 (listing all reviewed will contests).
 241. Cf. In re Estate of Dalbec, No. A04-1524, 2005 WL 1619867, at *2, *6 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 12, 2005) (upholding a will despite the fact that the spouse of a beneficiary acted as a witness); 
In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853, 857, 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (invalidating a will where 
the notary’s acknowledgment clause identified the will beneficiary as a subscribing witness even
though another person actually signed the will as a witness). 
242. Natale, supra note 74, at 169.
243. John J. Harris, Genuine—or Forged?, 32 J. ST. B. CAL. 658, 660 (1957). 
244. In re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803, 807 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Perkins v. Swafford (In
re Estate of Peery), No. E1999-02318-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 222617, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 
28, 2000).
245. Dean v. Dickey, 225 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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 897 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
fabricate witness signatures.246 Notarization seems to suffer from, if not 
exacerbate, the same defect. As mentioned in Part II, one of the most 
striking commonalities in forged wills is that they were notarized.247 In
fact, faith in notarization creates an additional risk: the fanfare of an
official seal can give a document an imprimatur it does not deserve.
Indeed, courts and litigants may be less likely to question a purported 
will that boasts this veneer of legitimacy. Counterintuitively, then, 
permitting notarized wills may actually provide less protection than the 
traditional attestation requirement.248 
Finally, policymakers should keep forgery in mind as they address 
the nascent issue of electronic wills. As noted, several jurisdictions 
246. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
 247. See Vieira v. Vieira, No. CV020172366S, 2004 WL 2361556 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 
2004); In re Estate of Tinley, No. CIV.A. 1318-K, 2001 WL 765177 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001), aff’d
sub nom. Tinley v. Pleasanton, 791 A.2d 751 (Del. 2002) (unpublished table decision); Waters v. 
Iverson (In re Estate of Waters), No. 1-13-1262, 2014 WL 4402826 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5, 2014);
Castor v. Pulaski, 985 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 2014); In re Estate of Greene, 932 N.Y.S.2d 544 
(App. Div. 2011); Estate of Konjolka v. Brown (In re Estate of Konjolka), No. 1664 WDA 2015,
2017 WL 2704070 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 22, 2017); In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2009); In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct.
14, 2014). Similarly, in the related context of counterfeit deeds, many cases involve stolen or
fabricated notaries’ seals or fraud committed by notaries. See Geggis & Roustan, supra note 189 
(reporting on the use of “fraudulent notary signatures”); Olinger, supra note 190 (reporting on a
notary who conceded that she broke the law); Olsen, supra note 177 (reporting on fraud involving
“faked notaries’ seals” and notaries acting as accomplices to fraud); Segall, supra note 175 (“[T]he 
notaries who supposedly stamped and signed [deeds] each say they didn’t.”). Attorneys also have
been careless about notarizing wills and deeds outside the presence of necessary signatories. See
In re Brown, 68 So. 3d 1023, 1027 (La. 2011) (affirming attorney suspension for notarizing a forged
will when attorney could not see parties present at will execution); Lorain Cty. Bar Ass’n v. 
Kennedy, 766 N.E.2d 151, 152 (Ohio 2002) (“Respondent . . . admitted that she had notarized the 
quitclaim deeds before they were submitted to the grantor.”).
248. To be sure, some jurisdictions allow forgery victims to recover tort damages against
notarial officers for negligent and willful misconduct. See City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Metcalf,
775 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (affirming liability for negligently notarizing quitclaim
deed). But see NationsBank of N.C. v. Parker, 535 S.E.2d 597, 599 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“Absent
allegations of malice or corruption a notary may not be held liable for acts within her scope of 
duties.” (quoting McGee v. Eubanks, 335 S.E.2d 178, 182 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985))). However, 
plaintiffs in these cases need to establish causation, which can be tricky. See Bussman v. Krizoe,
520 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a notary’s negligence was not the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s damages); Immerman v. Ostertag, 199 A.2d 869, 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1964) (stating that a notary was negligent for notarizing a document signed by a person
impersonating a deceased mortgage guarantor, but that the plaintiff failed to establish a link to
its loss); Rastelli v. Gassman, 647 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (App. Div. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss 
a mortgagees’ complaint for notarial misconduct). Finally, notaries often lack deep pockets to pay 
tort damages, and liability is personal to the notary—not vicarious to the notary’s employer. See
Vancura v. Katris, 939 N.E.2d 328, 346 (Ill. 2010) (“[W]hen a notary public wrongfully or
negligently exercises the powers of the office, it is the notary alone who becomes liable.”).
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898 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
have either passed or are considering legislation that validates digital 
testamentary instruments.249 Some of these laws permit testators to 
legitimate their handiwork by using technology instead of obtaining 
traditional witness signatures. For example, Arizona and Nevada now 
admit documents to probate that bear the testator’s electronic 
signature and a so-called “authentication characteristic”:  
“Authentication characteristic” means a characteristic of a certain 
person that is unique to that person and that is capable of 
measurement and recognition in an electronic record as a biological
aspect of or physical act performed by that person. Such a 
characteristic may consist of a fingerprint, a retinal scan, voice
recognition, facial recognition, video recording, a digitized signature
or other commercially reasonable authentication using a unique
characteristic of the person.250 
In addition, these statutes go even further than the 2008 revisions 
to the UPC by accepting “electronic notarization” in lieu of
attestation.251 Electronic notarization refers to a process in which the
testator and the notarial officer are in “[d]ifferent physical locations 
but can communicate with each other by means of audio-video 
communication.”252 
These futuristic makeovers of the Wills Act have the potential to 
both deter and invite forgery. Some authentication characteristics, such 
as fingerprints, voice recognition, and retinal scans, are probably 
harder to fabricate than signatures, attestation clauses, and self-
proving affidavits. If the new statutes limited the universe of witness 
substitutes to these biometric measures, they might make digital wills 
249. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
 250. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(5)(a) (2018); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-351 (2018)
(defining “electronic signature” based on similar requirements). The Silver State actually passed
an e-will statute in 2001. See NEV. REV. STAT. c. 458, § 9(1)(b) (2001). However, the law made
almost no impact because it required anticopying software that had not yet been developed. See
Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills To Join the
Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 865, 891 (2007). Similar bills have been introduced in
California and the District of Columbia. See Assemb. B. 3095, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018); Leg. B. 169, 22d Period (D.C. 2017). Alternatively, Indiana’s e-will statute continues to
require attestation. See H.E.A. 1303, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018). 
251. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-352; NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085. The Uniform Law 
Commission’s draft Electronic Wills Act also permits digital wills to be “acknowledged by the
testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to notarize records
electronically.” DRAFT ELECTRONIC WILLS ACT, supra note 114, at 6. However, the provision
appears in brackets, which indicates that not all states are expected to include it. 
252. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.088(1)(a)(2). 
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 899 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
more reliable than their paper-based counterparts. However, other 
authentication characteristics are ill-advised. For instance, the catchall
for “commercially reasonable” authentication techniques seems 
dubious. “Commercially reasonable” means “in accordance with
commonly accepted . . . practice.”253 Yet as has been demonstrated in 
the context of life insurance, just because a protective measure is 
widely used does not make it effective. Similarly, we are skeptical of 
electronic notarization. Indeed, the frequency of notarial misconduct 
in face-to-face transactions casts doubt on the wisdom of opening the 
door to remote notarization.254 In fact, former Florida Governor Rick 
Scott recently vetoed an electronic Wills Act passed by the state
legislature for this very reason.255 Accordingly, lawmakers should
delete these provisions.  
2. Burden-Shifting. Courts should also reform the burden of 
persuasion in will-forgery litigation. As this Section explains, they can 
do so by borrowing the infrastructure from undue influence contests.  
Under current law, a will’s proponents enjoy a powerful
procedural advantage. As we mentioned above, well-drafted wills 
contain either an attestation clause or a self-proving affidavit, in which 
the witnesses declare that they saw the testator sign or acknowledge 
the document.256 These provisions are invaluable in uncontested 
estates. They permit the court to enforce an instrument without having 
to solicit live testimony, and they spare the proponent from having to
produce witnesses who may have died, relocated, or forgotten “acts 
that . . . occurred years or even decades earlier.”257 Thus, courts give
these devices tremendous weight. Indeed, “[a]n attestation clause is 
253. Commercially Reasonable, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
254. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
 255. See Letter from Rick Scott, Fla. Governor, to Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State (June 26,
2017), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/HB-277-Veto-Letter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DWH6-77VV] (“While the concept of remote notarization is meant to provide 
increased access to legal services like estate planning, the remote notarization provisions in the
bill do not adequately ensure authentication of the identity of the parties to the transaction . . .
.”).
 256. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. Courts and scholars also refer to a will as
“self-proving” if it is accompanied by a contemporaneously or subsequently sworn affidavit of
attesting witnesses reciting the fact of due execution. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (amended
2010). 
257. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits, supra note 98, at 40; see also Reid Kress Weisbord, The 
Advisory Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 158–59 (2015) (describing how the self-proving 
affidavit replaced live testimony in proceedings to probate a will). 
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900 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it,”258 and a self-proving
affidavit “satisfies the requirements for execution without the 
testimony of any attesting witness.”259 
However, in forgery disputes, this norm of blithely deferring to
attestation clauses and self-proving affidavits has unfortunate 
consequences. First, it allows wrongdoers to create a force field around
sham wills. The mere appearance of an attestation clause or a self-
proving affidavit satisfies the presumption of due execution, saddling 
the contestant with proving her claim of forgery by clear and
convincing evidence.260 But forgers can concoct these provisions as 
easily as they can manufacture any other part of a fake instrument.
Moreover, attestation clauses and self-proving affidavits contain 
factual statements that are hard to impeach. After all, they are out-of-
court assertions by individuals who often cannot be cross-examined. 
Accordingly, the law sets too high a bar for forgery challenges.
Moreover, even when forgery contestants prevail, the validity 
presumption arising from an attestation clause or self-proving affidavit 
often exacerbates the cost of litigating a will contest. For instance, in In 
re Estate of Pendergrass, the proponent forged a self-proving affidavit 
258. In re Estate of Politowicz, 304 A.2d 569, 570 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (emphasis
omitted); see also Estate of Smith v. Koontz (In re Estate of Smith), 668 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996) (“If the will contains an attestation clause, which shows on its face that all statutory 
guidelines have been met, and the signatures are admittedly genuine, a prima facie case of proper
execution has been made.”); Slack v. Truitt, 791 A.2d 129, 133 (Md. 2002) (“The view ‘seems to 
prevail widely in other jurisdictions that a complete attestation clause showing observance of all
statutory requirements raises a presumption of the due execution of a will . . . .’” (quoting German
Evangelical Bethel Church v. Reith, 39 S.W.2d 1057, 1061 (Mo. 1931))).
 259. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406(1) (amended 2008). Fifteen jurisdictions have adopted 
this rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 reporter’s
note § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (listing state enactments).
 260. See In re Estate of Tinley, No. CIV.A. 1318-K, 2001 WL 765177, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 26, 
2001) (requiring proof of will forgery “by evidence which is clear, direct, precise and convincing”),
aff’d sub nom. Tinley v. Pleasanton, 791 A.2d 751 (Del. 2002) (unpublished table decision); Slack, 
791 A.2d at 133 (“We have held that once the presumption [of validity] attaches, the burden of
proof is on the caveator to show by clear and convincing evidence that the facts stated in the
attestation clause are untrue.” (footnote omitted)); Kita v. Matuszak, 222 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1974) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove will forgery); In re Politowicz, 
304 A.2d at 570–71 (“The attestation clause is now accepted as ‘a most important element of 
proof’ and the derivative presumption is deemed impregnable unless it is devastated by ‘strong
and convincing evidence.’” (quoting In re DuBois’ Estate, 76 A.2d 33, 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1950))); In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 967 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence to prove will forgery). The UPC’s validity presumption for self-proving wills
does contain an exception for “evidence of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or
affidavit,” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406(1) (emphasis added), but otherwise allocates the burden
of proving fraud to contestants, id. § 3-407.
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 901 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
to support the bogus will of Teddy Pendergrass.261 The court initially 
held that the document had been properly executed and granted letters 
testamentary to the wrongdoer.262 The contestants then proved that the
forger’s “entire case was . . . [a] house of cards” built on perjured 
testimony.263 Yet to overcome the probate court’s initial validity
presumption, the contestants had to conduct “extensive discovery” and
incur the cost of mounting eight days of witness testimony.264 
Rather than this blunt approach, courts should adopt the nuanced 
burden-shifting regime used in undue influence claims. This venerable 
common law rubric recognizes that undue influence contestants often
lack access to direct evidence of the proponent’s wrongdoing.265 It 
compensates for this evidentiary disadvantage by accepting a threshold
showing of wrongdoing by mere inference rather than by clear and 
convincing proof.266 Although the law varies slightly by state, a 
presumption of undue influence generally arises when a contestant
proves (1) that there was a confidential relationship between the 
testator and the wrongdoer, and (2) there were one or more suspicious 
circumstances, such as proof that (a) the testator was mentally or 
physically infirm, (b) the wrongdoer helped create the will, or (c) the
instrument leaves the property in an “unnatural or unusual way.”267 
261. Last Will and Testament of Theodore DeReese Pendergrass, supra note 133. 
262. In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Oct. 14, 2014). 
263. Id. at *15.
 264. Id. at *1. 
265. See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. e
(AM. LAW. INST. 2003) (“Direct evidence of the wrongdoer’s conduct and the donor’s
subservience is rarely available to establish the actual exertion of undue influence.”).
 266. See id. (“The contestant’s case must usually be based on circumstantial evidence, and in
certain cases, is aided by a presumption of undue influence.”).
267. Mueller v. Wells (In re Estate of Barnes), 367 P.3d 580, 585 (Wash. 2016); see also Potter 
v. Coleman (In re Estate of Baker), 182 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556 (Ct. App. 1982) (linking the
presumption to “(1) the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the testator
and the person alleged to have exerted undue influence; (2) active participation by such person
in the preparation or execution of the will; and (3) an undue benefit to such person”); Cresto v.
Cresto (In re Estate of Cresto), 358 P.3d 831, 842 (Kan. 2015) (describing the “suspicious
circumstances” prong of the test). The doctrine of fraud recognizes a similar presumption of 
invalidity in some circumstances. A donative transfer is not enforceable if the donor was deceived
by the wrongdoer’s knowing or reckless false representation about a material fact. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3. Although this
principle does not generally apply to material omissions, courts may assume that the failure to
disclose a material fact was fraudulent if “the alleged wrongdoer was in a confidential relationship
with the donor.” Id. § 8.3 cmt. j. Tilting the scales in this way eases the burden on fraud contestants
who would otherwise have to overcome the formidable challenge of disproving a negative—that
is, the fact of omission—while handicapped by the “worst evidence” problem. See supra note 34 
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902 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
Once a contestant satisfies this threshold inquiry, the burden then shifts
to the proponent to prove—often by clear and convincing evidence— 
that the contested gift was voluntary.268 
Our research highlights the factors that courts could use to create
a similar presumption for inauthentic wills. In particular, five themes 
run throughout successful forgery contests. First, although some 
counterfeit wills seem unremarkable to the naked eye, others have 
obvious incongruities. These dark hallmarks of forgery include
document errors that would have been obvious to the testator or 
attesting witnesses,269 signatures that sharply deviate from previous
examples,270 and extrinsic evidence refuting the contested instrument.
For instance, a court might credit lay testimony that the handwriting
on a document is “far too neat and perfect”271 or that a disabled testator 
“was not physically capable of signing anything”272 to find that an 
alleged will “excites suspicion.”273 
and accompanying text. Indeed, a California statute takes this concept one step further: it 
enumerates six categories of transferees who are presumed to have procured a donative transfer
through fraud by reason of the transferee’s close relationship with the transferor. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 21380 (West 2018). 
268. See Broochian v. Feiner (In re Estate of Feiner), No. A-0561-15T3, 2017 WL 4364482, at
*5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 3, 2017)(“To rebut the presumption after the burden switches,
the beneficiary of a gift challenged for undue influence must establish his or her case by clear and 
convincing evidence.”). Admittedly, scholars have criticized the capaciousness of undue influence
for inviting courts to invoke the doctrine as pretext for setting aside voluntary but socially
objectionable donative choices. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 243–58 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 571, 611 (1997); Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should
Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 267 (2010); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 346–55 (2017) (commenting that isolation and coercion are better
predicates for undue influence than susceptibility). However, because forgery involves egregious
wrongdoing—not the inkblot question of whether influence is “undue”—it does not seem
susceptible to a similar critique. 
269. See In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (noting that “a
signature . . . and typed name . . . did not appear appropriately situated”).
 270. See Brown v. Brown, 592 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. 2004) (relying in part on lay testimony
about “the differences between [the testator’s] true signature and the signature on the will”); In 
re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803, 807 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (featuring “seventy-five discrepancies
between the signature on the contested document and the undisputed signatures of the 
decedent”).
 271. In re Cruciani, 986 A.2d at 855. 
272. In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432, at *2 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Oct. 14, 2014). 
273. In re Estate of Link, 542 S.W.3d 438, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). As noted in supra notes
142–44 and accompanying text, Tennessee requires the proponent to disprove forgery when the
face of the will “excites suspicion.” Under this proposal, physical abnormalities would be just one 
of several factors that would shift the burden.
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 903 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
Second, there is often a confidential relationship between the 
testator and the forger.274 Admittedly, as with undue influence,
intimacy can cut in two directions.275 Testators might naturally want to
reward caretakers, companions, and employees. But wrongdoers can 
also exploit their knowledge about a decedent’s life to build a façade 
of legitimacy. For example, in one case, the testator’s close friend used
his access to the testator’s house to place a forged will in the most 
convincing of locations: her Bible.276 With this in mind, when grappling
with forgery allegations, courts should be sensitive to this form of 
opportunism. 
Third, a will’s drafting history can indicate that it is a forgery. For 
instance, involvement of a crooked attorney does not bode well for a 
proposed will’s legitimacy. Unfortunately for the reputation of the 
legal profession, phony wills are often written by lawyers who stand to 
inherit from the testator or who are paid by beneficiaries of the forged
will. Francis X. Morrissey, who was disbarred after forging a codicil in
the estate of socialite Brooke Astor, is perhaps the most famous 
example, but he is one of many crooked attorneys who are willing to
violate both the code of professional conduct and criminal law in
pursuit of greed.277 In addition, homemade wills prepared without 
professional assistance are vulnerable to forgery.278 In particular, one
274. See In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217, 1221 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018) (concerning forgery 
by a decedent’s bookkeeper); Perkins v. Swafford (In re Estate of Peery), No. E1999-02318-COA-
R3-CV, 2000 WL 222617, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2000) (concerning forgery by a testator’s
caretaker). 
275. As noted above, the presumption of undue influence usually requires a confidential 
relationship. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. However, there should be no such bright-
line requirement for forgery. Unlike undue influence, which arises when a trusted person
capitalizes on their power over the decedent, forgery can occur even when the wrongdoer has
little interaction with the testator.
 276. See In re Peery, 2000 WL 222617, at *1. 
277. See In re Morrissey, 898 N.Y.S.2d 1, 1 (App. Div. 2010); see also United States v. Holmes, 
193 F.3d 200, 201 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Pioch, No. 3:14CR403, 2017 WL 1376410, at *1 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 902 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2018); People v.
Molloy, No. E028980, 2002 WL 1943534, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2002); Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n of Md. v. Coppola, 19 A.3d 431, 433 (Md. 2011); State v. Keith, Nos. 76469, 76479 &
76610, 2000 WL 1176886, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2000); State v. Hamann, 630 N.E.2d 384,
386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Skelton v. State, No. 04-08-00720-CR, 2010 WL 2298859, at *1 (Tex. 
App. June 9, 2010), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Ex parte Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. App.
2014). 
278. See Vieira v. Vieira, No. CV020172366S, 2004 WL 2361556, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 
14, 2004) (featuring false assertions that the decedent wrote his own will); In re Estate of
Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 14, 2014), 2014 WL 11201432, at *12 (same); 
In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (same); In re Estate of Presutti, 
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904 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
glaring sign of forgery is the fact that a testator supposedly executed a 
will herself after “always us[ing] attorneys to draft them.”279 
Fourth, the forger is often the one to bring the bogus document to
the court’s attention. In case after case, the proponent of a sham will 
claims to have “discovered” it in a file cabinet280 or a safe deposit box,281 
often only after no other will is found.282 In one far-fetched scheme, a
woman contended that the testator entrusted her with the will, 
inexplicably told her to “keep it confidential,” and did not bat an
eyelash when she proceeded to “roam the world” with the document 
inside her motor home.283 
Fifth, many forged wills were allegedly signed just before the 
testator’s death. This tactic reduces the chance of a subsequently 
executed will surfacing, shortens the waiting time to inherit from the
estate, and allows a forger to exploit vulnerabilities associated with the 
testator’s mental decline. To capitalize on these advantages, 
counterfeit testamentary instruments tend to be dated during the last 
three months of the testator’s life.284 
When several of these warning signs are present, the burden 
should shift to the proponent to prove the validity of the document.
Although courts should have broad leeway to tailor each case to its 
facts, contestants should be required to prove that an alleged will 
suffers from at least two glimmers of forgery to make a prima facie case. 
Because some of these circumstances are relatively common, allowing
just one of them to change the litigation landscape might encourage 
baseless claims. But when these indicia appear in clusters, there is good 
reason to be wary. 
783 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (featuring a forged holograph); In re Peery, 2000 WL
222617, at *2 (same).
 279. In re Field, 414 P.3d at 1233. 
280. See, e.g., id. at 1222. 
281. See Keith, 2000 WL 1176886, at *1 (noting that the forger asserted “that he had 
discovered [the] Will in [the testator’s] safety deposit box”).
 282. See, e.g., In re Presutti, 783 A.2d at 805.
 283. Vieira, 2004 WL 2361556, at *3, *6.
 284. See, e.g., Duffer v. Richards (In re Estate of Richards), No. B226261, 2011 WL 6062018, 
at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2011) (describing a forged will allegedly signed about one month
before the testator passed away); Vieira, 2004 WL 2361556, at *1 (three months); In re Estate of
Tinley, No. CIV.A. 1318-K, 2001 WL 765177, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001) (two months), aff’d
sub nom. Tinley v. Pleasanton, 791 A.2d 751 (Del. 2002) (unpublished table decision); In re Field, 
414 P.3d at 1222 (about one month). 
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 905 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
To see how this proposal would work, return again to In re Estate
of Pendergrass.285 Rather than shifting the burden to the contestant
because the alleged will looks valid,286 the court would dig deeper. 
Through declarations or a short evidentiary hearing, the contestant 
could establish that (1) the testator had supposedly initialed the 
instrument seven times even though “he did not have the [requisite] 
fine motor skills”;287 (2) the writing was self-made, although the 
testator had previously hired an estate planner;288 (3) the proponent 
“did not disclose the existence of the [alleged] . . . will during the 
decedent’s life”;289 and (4) the testator had purportedly executed the
document a mere six months before he died.290 Forcing the proponent
to rebut these hallmarks of forgery would streamline the case and make
it easier for defrauded heirs and beneficiaries to vindicate their rights. 
B. Deed Authentication 
As this Article has noted, inheritance-related deed forgery has 
swept through the country.291 This Section proposes reforms that would 
ameliorate this widespread problem. In addition, it explains why our 
research sounds a note of caution about the current movement to
authorize TODDs. 
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that any proposal to
address the counterfeit-deed problem cannot be too ambitious. Some 
Deed Registers are swamped with paperwork. For example, Clark 
County, Nevada, “records more than 3,000 filings a day.”292 
Furthermore, Deed Registers usually lack legal training and may not 
be able to make fine-grained assessments about the validity of an
instrument.293 
However, estate-related forgeries highlight the need for additional 
oversight. Many of these transfers are obvious shams. For example, in 
285. See supra notes 129–38 and accompanying text.
 286. Cf. In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-X0189, 2014 WL 11201432, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. Oct. 14, 2014) (explaining that because the will appeared to be valid, “the burden of proof 
shifted immediately to the contestant”).
 287. Id. at *2–3. 
288. Id. at *4. 
289. Id. at *13.
 290. Id. at *1. 
291. See supra Part II.B. 
292. Segall, supra note 175.
 293. See Olsen, supra note 177 (noting that in Harris County, Texas, “officials say they haven’t 
time or expertise to verify documents”).
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906 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
some forgery cases, “the people whose signatures are on the deeds had
been dead for years.”294 The Georgia Supreme Court recently
confronted a deed that was “executed” in 2006 by a woman who died
in 1974.295 Likewise, a federal court in Virginia dealt with a deed signed 
by someone who had died a decade earlier.296 At the opposite end of 
this spectrum, a counterfeiter in Pennsylvania recorded a deed in the 
name of a “deceased” woman who was, in fact, still alive.297 The
document stated that she had “departed this life on [_____]” but the 
forger did not “bother[] to complete the sentence.”298 These brazen 
examples demonstrate why the current system is broken. 
Against this backdrop, a few simple steps could stem the tide of
counterfeit deeds to decedents’ homes. First, states could empower 
Deed Registers to refuse to record sketchy documents. The problem is 
not simply that “anyone can file a property transfer record or 
ownership claim without providing ID or other proof.”299 Instead, the
problem is that many jurisdictions require Deed Registers to rubber-
stamp any instrument that seems facially compliant.300 Indeed, some
Deed Registers have expressly asked for the power to reject suspicious 
deeds, which could close the loophole that inspired widespread fraud
in the first place.301 
For example, states could require Deed Registers to cross-
reference the name of the transferor with death records, as an alarming 
294. Ryan Kath, Investigation of Apparent Real Estate Fraud Scheme Questions If Notary 
Signatures Were Forged, KSHB41 KAN. CITY (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:41 PM),
http://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/investigations/investigation-of-apparent-real-estate-
fraud-scheme-questions-if-notary-signatures-were-forged [https://perma.cc/RFC9-YXWE]; see
also Deramo v. Laffey, 52 N.Y.S.3d 119, 121 (App. Div. 2017) (describing a forgery purportedly 
executed two years after the property owner’s death); First Nat’l Bank of Nev. v. Williams, 904
N.Y.S.2d 707, 708 (App. Div. 2010) (describing a deed conveyance pursuant to the durable power
of attorney that was executed after the property owner’s death); Ramos v. Turvey, No. 988 EDA 
2013, 2014 WL 10920381, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 13, 2014) (describing a forgery purportedly
executed more than two years after the property owner’s death). Other forgers are careful to date
conveyances shortly before the owner’s death. See, e.g., Grimes v. Grimes, 975 N.E.2d 496, 499
(Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (describing a forgery executed two months before the victim’s death and
recorded the same day as the death); Bryant v. Bryant, 856 N.Y.S.2d 22, 2007 WL 4458189, at *1 
(Sur. Ct. Dec. 20, 2007) (describing a forgery executed three months before the victim’s death and
recorded posthumously).
295. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Veatch, 710 S.E.2d 744, 744 (Ga. 2011).
296. El-Yacoubi v. Hetrick (In re Hetrick), 379 B.R. 612, 615 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
 297. McCoy, A Philadelphia Story, supra note 104. 
298. Id.
 299. Olsen, supra note 177. 
300. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
 301. See Parker, supra note 191.
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 907 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
number of forged deeds purport to be executed after the owner has 
passed away.302 Given this, it makes sense to confirm that an alleged 
grantor even could have executed a deed. Likewise, Deed Registers 
could demand additional evidence before recording a document
supposedly executed by a decedent. The probate process generates a
court order appointing a personal representative and validating a will. 
Predicating the transfer of a decedent’s real property on an applicant 
furnishing one of these forms of proof would make it harder to 
manufacture a fake deed to a decedent’s property.303 
Short of granting Deed Registers a discretionary rejection power, 
an alternative reform could authorize officials to file an optional 
irregularity report alongside any suspicious deed. This procedure
would provide constructive notice of irregularities that call into 
question a deed’s authenticity. It would also create a contemporaneous 
public record useful to potential contestants in subsequent deed-
forgery litigation. Unlike a discretionary rejection power, an
irregularity report would accompany—but not invalidate—the 
suspicious deed, thereby avoiding procedural delays that could
undermine the Recording Act’s notice function and property law’s 
priority-of-ownership doctrine. To limit the duration of uncertainty 
created by a recorded irregularity, such reports could be expunged 
automatically by operation of law if no one contests the deed within a 
limitations period of one or two years.  
Finally, the security vulnerabilities of recording procedures also 
raise new questions about the recent TODD trend. As mentioned 
above, sixteen states have enacted the URPTDA, which allows owners 
302. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
303. There is precedent for such a measure: in Philadelphia, where posthumous deed forgery
is quite common, the City Council enacted a 2010 ordinance mandating that deeds submitted on
behalf of a decedent’s estate be accompanied by a probate court order appointing a personal 
representative. See PHILA., PA., CODE tit. 2, § 2-202(2)(a) (2010). The ordinance also requires the 
Commissioner of Records to mail a copy of all recorded deeds to the prior owner within thirty
days of recording. Id. § 2-202(6). In 2013, City Council enacted further legislation authorizing the 
establishment of a Real Estate Fraud Victims’ Assistance Program to “serve as a ‘one-stop’ shop
for the victims of real estate theft with the goal of ensuring that such victims receive hands-on 
assistance throughout the process to recover real property stolen through fraudulent recording of
a deed.” Id. § 2-206(1). Unfortunately, however, the city’s Commissioner of Records has been
criticized for failing to comply with these requirements. See McCoy, A Philadelphia Story, supra 
note 104. Furthermore, forgeries involving the impersonation of executors continued immediately
after the city adopted the ordinance. See U.S. Attorney’s Office, Defendant Who Sold Homes He 
Did Not Own Gets 70-Month Prison Term, FBI PHILA. (July 31, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/philadelphia/news/press-releases/defendant-who-
sold-homes-he-did-not-own-gets-70-month-prison-term [https://perma.cc/P37N-YT95].
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908 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
of real property to convey title at death outside of probate by
designating a beneficiary directly on the deed itself.304 The URPTDA
does not address forgery anywhere in its statutory content or 
comments. 
The Reporter’s comments, however, do contain two brief remarks 
concerning fraud. First, it explains that the requirement of a notarized 
certificate of acknowledgement “helps to prevent fraud.”305 But we
know from the rash of notarized forged deeds that acknowledgment 
does very little to prevent forgery. Second, the Reporter’s comment
notes that the statutory mandate to record all TODDs “before the
transferor’s death”306 “helps to prevent fraud by ensuring that all steps 
necessary to the effective transfer on death deed are completed during
the transferor’s lifetime. The requirement of recordation before death 
also enables all parties to rely on the recording system.”307 Deed 
forgers, however, have already outsmarted this protection by recording
forged deeds shortly before the transferor’s death.308 Furthermore, the
failure of Deed Registers to authenticate deeds before recording them 
undermines any reliance on the recording system to detect or prevent
forgery. Accordingly, states should not pass TODD legislation until 
Deed Registers enhance their antiforgery practices.  
C. Beneficiary Designations 
As we have observed, life insurance carriers have not taken 
adequate steps to insulate beneficiary designations from forgery.309 
This Section argues that two subtle doctrinal changes would prompt
companies to fix these flaws. 
The reason that life insurers have created such half-hearted 
formalities is simple: they enjoy virtual impunity from the 
consequences of paying the wrong person. Comparing these entities to 
financial-service enterprises is instructive. Federal law gives banks
strong incentives to monitor consumer transactions by capping 
consumer liability for fraudulent charges, thereby shifting the lion’s 
304. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
 305. UNIF. REAL PROP. TRANSFER ON DEATH ACT § 9(1) cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2009).
 306. Id. § 9(3).
 307. Id. § 9(3) cmt.
 308. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
 309. See supra Part II.C. 
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 909 2020] INHERITANCE FORGERY
share of risk to the firm.310 Also, regulations designed to combat money 
laundering and terrorism require banks to verify the identities of their 
customers.311 As a result, these entities take security seriously, and even 
go so far as to block the accounts of clients who do not reply to
authentication inquiries.312 Likewise, ratcheting up the pressure on life
insurance companies by imposing greater liability would force them to 
revamp their antiforgery safeguards. For instance, carriers might 
abandon misguided norms, such as requiring new irrevocable
beneficiaries to sign the policy.313 Even better, they could experiment 
with novel procedures, such as offering an online password-protected
designation process or sending an automatic email or text message to 
the insured notifying her of policy changes.314 To catalyze these
reforms, however, insurers must internalize the costs of forgery 
disputes. 
One way to accomplish this goal would be to reject carriers’ 
requests for litigation expenses in interpleader actions. To be sure, “the 
general rule is that a disinterested ‘mere stakeholder’ plaintiff who 
brings a necessary interpleader action is entitled to a reasonable award 
of attorneys’ fees.”315 However, a handful of jurisdictions exempt 
insurers under the “normal-course-of-business” exception.316 This
carve out starts from the premise that fee awards are supposed to take 
the financial sting out of being forced to spend money to resolve
310. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (2018) (limiting consumer liability for timely reported billing errors 
to $50 for credit card charges not made by the accountholder).
 311. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230 (2018) (establishing beneficial ownership authentication
requirements for accounts held by legal entities); Id. § 1020.220(a)(2) (establishing bank
authentication requirements for accounts held by individuals).
 312. See Telis Demos & Michael Siconolfi, Rules Designed To Catch Terrorists Cost This
Unsuspecting Customer Her Bank Account, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2018, 11:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/rules-designed-to-catch-terrorists-cost-this-unsuspecting-customer-
her-bank-account-1531495802 [https://perma.cc/TF85-M4U9].
 313. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
314. Some companies have begun to enact similar measures. See  BENEFICIARY CHANGE 
REQUEST, MASSMUTUAL, https://www.massmutual.com/efiles/life/pdfs/fr2265.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J33P-YN4X] (allowing policyholders to elect to receive updates about the status
of their beneficiary designations); Commonly Asked Questions—Beneficiaries, NORTHWESTERN 
MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO., https://www.northwesternmutual.com/faq/#beneficiaries 
[https://perma.cc/2M96-D98A] (“To view or change beneficiary information, go to the details
page of your individual policy or investment account by logging in.”).
315. Unum Life Ins. of Am. v. Kelling, 170 F. Supp. 2d 792, 793 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
316. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Mandalay Shores Coop. Hous. Ass’n (In re Mandalay Shores 
Coop. Hous. Ass’n), 21 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1994). For more such cases, see infra notes 318– 
20.
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910 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
someone else’s dispute.317 Although the typical plaintiff unexpectedly
finds itself caught between adversaries—and thus has no way to recoup
its costs—an insurer knows that it will often need to ask for judicial 
intervention.318 This certainty means these entities can simply plan for 
interpleader as an “ordinary cost of doing business.”319 
Courts that follow the normal-course-of-business exception also 
reason that carriers are not neutral bystanders. Instead, these firms
have a stake in the outcome because interpleader exonerates them
from “all liability in regard to the fund.”320 Seen through this prism, it 
is “unreasonable to award an insurance company fees for bringing an 
action which is primarily in its own self-interest.321 
Admittedly, the normal-course-of-business exception “has been 
little followed and roundly criticized.”322 For example, the influential 
Wright and Miller treatise condemns it for ignoring powerful fairness 
concerns:
Insofar as these decisions rest on the notion that the stakeholder
benefits by being discharged, they are wrongly decided because all
stakeholders benefit by being able to use interpleader and that alone
does not negate the equitable considerations supporting an award of 
attorney fees. Further, the cost-of-business rationale fails to recognize
317. See In re Mandalay Shores, 21 F.3d at 383 (reasoning that fee awards compensate
“innocent stakeholders who unwittingly come into possession of a disputed asset”). 
318. See Minn. Life Ins. v. Rings, No. 2:16-CV-00149, 2018 WL 4376793, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
14, 2018) (“Such cases are squarely within the normal course of business for insurance 
companies . . . .”); Guardian Life Ins. v. Gilmore, 45 F. Supp. 3d 310, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[M]inor problems that arise in the payment of insurance policies must be expected and the
expenses incurred are part of the ordinary course of business.” (quoting Metro. Life Ins. v.
Mitchell, 966 F. Supp. 2d 97, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2013))); see also Reliastar Life Ins. v. Moore, No. 
1:CV-08-1942, 2010 WL 773457, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2010); OM Fin. Life Ins. v. At Need
Funding, LLC, No. 4:08-CV-0103-HLM, 2008 WL 11337691, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2008).
319. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1965) (“We are not
impressed with the notion that whenever a minor problem arises in the payment of insurance
policies, insurers may, as a matter of course, transfer a part of their ordinary cost of doing business 
to their insureds by bringing an action for interpleader.”); Banner Life Ins. v. U.S. Bank, 931 F.
Supp. 2d 629, 632 (D. Del. 2013) (“Awarding attorney fees to insurance companies would shift 
their ordinary business expenses to the claimants, which is not generally appropriate.”); Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. v. McElroy, No. 2:10-CV-488-RDP, 2010 WL 11615016, at *2 (N.D. Ala.
June 3, 2010) (opining that an insurer that files an interpleader action engages in conduct that “it
has already been paid premiums to perform”).
320. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. v. Gustafson, 415 F. Supp. 615, 618–19 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
 321. Id. at 619.
322. Waters Edge Living, LLC v. RSUI Indem. Co., No. 4:06CV334-RH/WCS, 2008 WL
11342633, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2008); see also Am. Gen. Life Ins. v. Russell, No. CV 16-851-
JWD-RLB, 2018 WL 3240964, at *3 (M.D. La. July 2, 2018) (“[T]he Court will not take such a 
strict approach here.”). 
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that other equitable concerns should be consulted in determining 
whether fees or costs are warranted.323 
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to treat forgery cases 
differently. The majority view may be correct that insurers should
usually receive reimbursement when they use interpleader to resolve
an incapacity or undue influence claim. In that situation, the company 
is not at fault: it cannot probe the mental acuity or intimate 
relationships of every policyholder who submits a beneficiary 
designation. Conversely, insurers often bear some responsibility for 
causing forgery litigation, as many of these lawsuits stem from poorly 
designed safety measures.324 Likewise, as decisions like Chesapeake
Life Insurance Co. v. Parker illustrate, firms often fail to detect 
flagrantly bogus signatures.325 Lastly, when a carrier recovers its
litigation expenses from the life insurance proceeds rather than from
the losing party, impleader reimbursement unfairly forces the
prevailing party to pay for someone else’s litigation costs. Thus, the
equitable considerations that normally entitle interpleader plaintiffs to 
recoup their costs do not always apply. 
Judges could also wield a heavier hammer outside of the 
interpleader context. Despite the prevalence of facility-of-payment 
statutes, not every court has immunized insurers for distributing 
proceeds under a counterfeit form. In Bigley v. Pacific Standard Life 
Insurance Co.,326 the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a company 
remained liable to the genuine beneficiary when it failed to detect a 
fake signature on a change-of-beneficiary request.327 The state high 
court reasoned that the fraudulent paperwork was not effective 
because the insurance contract declared that only “[t]he owner . . . may
323. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1719 (3d 
ed. 2001). Likewise, district judges who have expressed sympathy toward the exception have felt
constrained by binding authority to the contrary. See, e.g., Hearing v. Minn. Life Ins., 33 F. Supp.
3d 1035, 1043 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (describing the normal-course-of-business exception but
ultimately yielding to Eighth Circuit authority), aff’d, 793 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2015); Melton v. 
White, 848 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (W.D. Okla. 1994) (“[I]n the face of clear expressions favoring the 
award of attorney’s fees by Tenth Circuit courts in this circumstance, the Court is unwilling to
make an exception.”).
 324. See supra Part II.C. 
325. Chesapeake Life Ins. v. Parker, No. 18-C-643, 2018 WL 2766205, at *1 (E.D. Wis. June
8, 2018) (denying forgery contestants summary judgment in insurance death-beneficiary
designation contest); see supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
326. Bigley v. Pac. Standard Life Ins., 642 A.2d 4 (Conn. 1994).
 327. Id. at 6.
HORTON & WEISBORD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/15/2019 4:31 PM         
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
       
     
 
     
 
   
   
  
   
 
 
       
  
912 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
change the [b]eneficiary.”328 In turn, because the wrongdoer—not the 
owner—submitted the bogus designation, it “did not comply with the 
terms of the contract and, therefore, did not effect a change of
beneficiary.”329 
Unfortunately, Bigley’s precedential value is limited. Because 
Connecticut’s facility-of-payment statute is narrow, it was not actually 
at issue in the case.330 Instead, the decision is a purebred matter of 
contract interpretation. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Alabama and 
a Florida appellate court have called Bigley “unpersuasive,” reasoning
that it does not explain “why the insurer has a duty to discover forgeries 
but not to discover other irregularities, such as undue influence.”331 
However, the analysis above suggests that Bigley is correct to treat 
forgery distinctly. Insurers are not well situated to conduct a laborious 
investigation into whether a policyholder is competent and free from
coercion. But they can prevent and detect fake beneficiary 
designations. Thus, if there is no governing facility-of-payment law,
Bigley points in the right direction.  
In fact, even in jurisdictions that have broad facility-of-payment 
statutes, carriers might still be on the hook in egregious fact patterns.
As a general principle, these laws only protect insurers who release 
funds “in good faith” in reliance on a “form[] which appears regular in 
all respects.”332 This standard leaves the door open for courts to saddle 
companies with liability for failing to detect obvious forgeries. 
328. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
329. Id. Similarly, the policy stated that it could be changed “during the lifetime of the
Insured,” and the forger submitted the form after the policyholder had passed away. Id. (emphasis 
omitted).
330. Id. at 7 n.7. 
331. Fortis Benefits Ins. v. Pinkley, 926 So. 2d 981, 987–88 (Ala. 2005); Schwartz v. Guardian
Life Ins. of Am., 73 So. 3d 798, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“Bigley presents no useful
guidance . . . .”).
 332. Fortis Benefits Ins., 926 So. 2d at 989; see also Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir.
1993) (“[A]n insurer is discharged from all subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments
to a purported beneficiary without notice of any competing claims.”); Pabon Lugo v. MONY Life
Ins. of Am., 465 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 (D.P.R. 2006) (opining that the facility-of-payment law
governs “[a]bsent any proof of bad faith, fraud or reckless disregard”); Schwartz v. Mony Grp.,
Inc., No. CIV.A. 03-2578, 2004 WL 1698675, at *5 (E.D. La. July 28, 2004) (“Although the facility 
of payment statute does not specifically refer to an insurer’s ‘good faith’ payment of life insurance 
proceeds, it is well established that all contractual obligations in Louisiana must be performed in
good faith.”). But see Schwartz, 73 So. 3d at 808 (“[W]e decline to . . . impute a good faith 
requirement on the application of the statute . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom about inheritance forgery is incorrect.
The phenomenon is not rare, fictional, or anachronistic. To the 
contrary, it plagues wills, deeds, and life insurance beneficiary 
designations. And it has gone almost entirely unnoticed during a period
of active reform in the field of decedents’ estates. This Article has
brought the problem into the light and suggested ways to solve it. By 
making donative transfers harder to counterfeit, the legal system can
honor a decedent’s wishes, deter wrongdoers, and protect rightful heirs 
and beneficiaries. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Will-Forgery Contests 
Caption/Cite Year Jurisdiction
Will Set 
Aside?
Heard v. Lovett, 538 S.E.2d 434 (Ga.
2000)
2000 Georgia Remanded 
for new trial
State v. Keith, Nos. 76469, 76479, 
76610, 2000 WL 1176886 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 17, 2000)
2000 Ohio Will forgery 
conviction
Perkins v. Swafford (In re Estate of
Peery), No. E1999-02318-COA-
R3CV, 2000 WL 222617 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Feb. 28, 2000)
2000 Tennessee Yes
In re Estate of Tinley, No. CIV.A. 
1318-K, 2001 WL 765177 (Del. Ch. 
June 26, 2001)
2001 Delaware Yes
In re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
2001 Pennsylvania Yes
O’Keefe v. Burchett (In re Estate of 
O’Keefe), 833 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002) 
2002 Florida Yes
Kuerbitz v. Ballou (In re Estate of
Moore), No. 232589, 2002 WL 
31447117 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 1,
2002)
2002 Michigan Yes
Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335 (2d Cir. 
2002)
2002 New York
Lack of 
Jurisdiction
Stovall v. Mohler, 100 S.W.3d 424 
(Tex. App. 2002)
2002 Texas Yes
In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)
2003 Pennsylvania No
Valentine v. Elliott (In re Estate of
Delaney), 819 A.2d 968 (D.C. 2003)
2003 District of 
Columbia
Time-
barred
Vieira v. Vieira, No. CV020172366S,
2004 WL 2361556 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Sept. 14, 2004) 
2004 Connecticut Yes
Brown v. Brown, 592 S.E.2d 854 (Ga.
2004)
2004 Georgia Yes
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Jordan v. Fehr, 902 So. 2d 198 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
2005 Florida Yes
In re Estate of Dalbec, No. A04-1524,
2005 WL 1619867 (Minn. Ct. App. 
July 12, 2005)
2005 Minnesota No
In re Herman, 734 N.Y.S.2d 194 
(App. Div. 2001)
2005 New York No
In re Estate of Dane, 821 N.Y.S.2d
699 (App. Div. 2006)
2006 New York No
Allahverdi v. Asadourian, Nos.
B191586, B194739, 2007 WL 1806862 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2007)
2007 California
Probable 
cause
Cline v. Cline, No. 05 CA 822, 2007 
WL 901579 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 
2007)
2007 Ohio Time-
barred
Fletcher v. Harris, No. 14-05-00998-
CV, 2007 WL 1152651 (Tex. App. 
Apr. 19, 2007)
2007 Texas No 
(following
bench trial)
Hoegh v. Estate of Johnson, 985 So. 
2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
2008 Florida Yes
Estate of Brando v. Douglas (In re
Estate of Brando), No. B209699, 
2009 WL 2263557 (Cal. Ct. App. July
30, 2009)
2009 California Time-
barred
In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
2009 Pennsylvania Yes
In re Estate of Sand, No. A-1856-
08T1, 2010 WL 4272828 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. Nov. 1, 2010)
2010 New Jersey No
In re Will of Engelhardt, 950 
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sur. Ct. 2010) 
(unpublished table decision)
2010 New York No
In re Morrissey, 898 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. 
Div. 2010)
2010 New York Yes
Haisler v. Coburn, No. 10-09-00275-
CV, 2010 WL 2953372 (Tex. App. 
July 28, 2010)
2010 Texas No
Duffer v. Richards (In re Estate of
Richards), No. B226261, 2011 WL
6062018 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011)
2011 California Yes
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916 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:855 
In re Estate of Taylor, 936 N.Y.S.2d
61 (Sur. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table
decision)
2011 New York No
In re Estate of Werner, 960 N.Y.S.2d
53 (Sur. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table
decision)
2011 New York No
In re Estate of Greene, 932 N.Y.S.2d
544 (App. Div. 2011)
2011 New York
Triable
issue of fact
Kruzek v. Estate of Kruzek, No. 1-12-
1239, 2012 WL 6861498 (Ill. App. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2012)
2012 Illinois No
In re Estate of Angstadt, Nos. 1355
EDA 2013, 1356 EDA 2013, 2014 
WL 10919557 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 4,
2014)
2014 Pennsylvania No
Waters v. Iverson (In re Estate of
Waters), No. 1-13-1262, 2014 WL 
4402826 (Ill. App. Ct. Sept. 5, 2014)
2014 Illinois Yes
Castor v. Pulaski, 985 N.Y.S.2d 380
(App. Div. 2014)
2014 New York Yes
In re Estate of Pendergrass, No. 2010-
X0189, 2014 WL 11201432 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Oct. 14, 2014)
2014 Pennsylvania Yes
Guidi v. Hess (In re Estate of
Kalous), No. E059204, 2015 WL
5838246 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2015)
2015 California No
In re Estate of Rothberg, Nos. 2391
EDA 2014, 2795 EDA 2014, 2015 
WL 6954970 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 26, 
2015)
2015 Pennsylvania No
In re Estate of Folcher, 135 A.3d 128 
(N.J. 2016)
2016 New Jersey Yes
Ward v. Powers (In re Estate of
Ward), Nos. 327991, 329132, 2016
WL 5887857 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 6,
2016)
2016 Michigan Yes
In re Estate of Kiefner, No. 745 
WDA 2015, 2016 WL 4938157 (Pa.
Super. Ct. July 8, 2016)
2016 Pennsylvania No
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Estate of Konjolka v. Brown (In re
Konjolka), No. 1664 WDA 2015, 
2017 WL 2704070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
June 22, 2017)
2017 Pennsylvania Yes
In re Estate of Field, 414 P.3d 1217
(Kan. Ct. App. 2018)
2018 Kansas Yes
Peterson v. Kolinske (In re Estate of
Kolinski), No. 338327, 2018 WL
1833469 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 
2018)
2018 Michigan
Settlement 
agreement
Subtotal: 44
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Table 2: Deed-Forgery Litigation
Caption/Cite Year Jurisdiction
Deed Set 
Aside?
In re Estate of Dugger, No. 224629, 
2000 WL 1528710 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 
2000)
2000 Delaware Yes
Bedree v. Bedree, 747 N.E.2d 1192
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
2001 Indiana Yes
Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d
527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
2001 Tennessee
Triable issue 
of fact
Williams v. Nelms, No. 14-01-00907-
CV, 2002 WL 31599496 (Tex. App. 
Nov. 21, 2002)
2002 Texas Yes
Morrison v. Estate of DeMarco, 833 
So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
2002 Florida Yes
Webb v. Greer, No. 235424, 2003 WL
21675879 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 
2003)
2003 Michigan Yes
Cazares v. Cosby, 65 P.3d 1184 (Utah
2003)
2003 Utah
Triable issue 
of fact
Pope v. Saget, 817 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. 
Div. 2006)
2006 New York Yes
Estate of Pippins v. Pippins (In re
Estate of Pippins), No. A116677, 2007 
WL 3409392 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 
2007)
2007 California Yes
Bryant v. Bryant, 856 N.Y.S.2d 22
(Sur. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table 
decision)
2007 New York Yes
Cruz v. Cruz, 832 N.Y.S.2d 217 (App. 
Div. 2007) (unpublished table 
decision)
2007 New York Yes
El-Yacoubi v. Hetrick (In re Hetrick), 
379 B.R. 612 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)
2007 Virginia Yes
Casonhua v. Wash. Mut. Bank, Nos.
B218606, B218608, 2010 WL 4193214 
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010)
2010 California Yes
Travers v. Brown, 899 N.Y.S.2d 628
(App. Div. 2010)
2010 New York Yes
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First Nat’l Bank of Nev. v. Williams,
904 N.Y.S.2d 707 (App. Div. 2010)
2010 New York
Triable issue 
of fact
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Veatch, 
710 S.E.2d 744 (Ga. 2011)
2011 Georgia Yes
Layne v. Adkins, No. E2010-02189-
COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 13164949
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011)
2011 Tennessee Yes
Grimes v. Grimes, 975 N.E.2d 496 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2012)
2012 Ohio Yes
In re Estate of Whipple, No. 04-11-
00645-CV, 2013 WL 1641414 (Tex. 
App. Apr. 17, 2013)
2013 Texas
Triable issue 
of fact
Bohrer v. Atkins, 21 N.E.3d 186 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (unpublished
table decision)
2014 Massachusetts Yes
In re Marini, 989 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App.
Div. 2014)
2014 New York Yes
Ramos v. Turvey, No. 988 EDA 2013, 
2014 WL 10920381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
May 13, 2014)
2014 Pennsylvania Yes
Henties v. Schweppe, No. 03-13-
00593-CV, 2014 WL 2568490 (Tex. 
App. June 3, 2014)
2014 Texas Yes
Faison v. Lewis, 32 N.E.3d 400 (N.Y. 
2015) 
2015 New York Yes
Raccioppi v. Modeste (In re
Raccioppi), 10 N.Y.S.3d 131 (App.
Div. 2015)
2015 New York Triable issue 
of fact
In re Tenzer, 43 N.Y.S.3d 62 (App. 
Div. 2016)
2016 New York Yes
Wilson v. Pickel, No. E2015-01472-
COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3595505 
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2016)
2016 Tennessee
Triable issue 
of fact
Meyers v. Meyers, No. 
HHDCV166067348S, 2017 WL
6601588 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 
2017)
2017 Connecticut
Probable 
cause for 
prejudgment 
remedy
Deramo v. Laffey, 52 N.Y.S.3d 119 
(App. Div. 2017)
2017 New York Yes
Subtotal: 29
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Table 3: Life Insurance Beneficiary Form Forgery Litigation
Caption/Cite Year Jurisdiction Transfer Set
Aside?
Oto v. Metro. Life Ins., 224 F.3d 601 
(7th Cir. 2000)
2000 Illinois Yes
Metro. Life Ins. v. Biggs, 68 F. App’x 
644 (6th Cir. 2003)
2003 Michigan No
Dimattia v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins., 923 
So. 2d 126 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
2005 Louisiana Triable issue 
of fact
State Farm Life Ins. v. Vivian, No. CIV 
S-05-1738 WBS EFB PS, 2006 WL 
3734666 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2006), 
report and recommendation adopted,
No. CIV-S-05-1738 WBS EFB PS, 2007 
WL 430737 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007)
2006 California Forgery 
claim settled
Alcini v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins., No. CV 08-
2889-VBF(AJWX), 2008 WL 11337727
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2008)
2008 California Triable issue 
of fact
Pan-Am. Life Ins. of Am. v. Pinto, No.
05-22969-CIV, 2008 WL 2627708 (S.D. 
Fla. July 3, 2008)
2008 Florida Yes
Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 213 P.3d
197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)
2009 Arizona Yes
Feehan v. Feehan, No. 09 CIV.
7016(DAB)(THK), 2010 WL 3734082 
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 09 CIV.
7016(DAB), 2010 WL 3734079
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010)
2010 New York Triable issue 
of fact
Metro. Life Ins. v. Thomas, No. 1:10-
CV-00290, 2011 WL 2470001 (W.D. 
Mich. June 20, 2011)
2011 Michigan No
Czyz v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 
No. 1:08-CV-00767 MV/RHS, 2011 WL
13269505 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2011)
2011 New 
Mexico
No
Companion Life Ins. v. Saddler, C/A 
No. 3:11-314-JFA, 2012 WL 252789 
(D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2012)
2012 South 
Carolina
Yes
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Guardian Life Ins. of Am. v. Bowes,
No. 6:11-CV-00040, 2012 WL 1378556
(W.D. Va. Apr. 20, 2012)
2012 Virginia No
Metro. Life Ins. v. Beals, No. 1:12-CV-
3309-WBH, 2014 WL 11822761 (N.D. 
Ga. Feb. 5, 2014)
2014 Georgia Triable issue 
of fact
Metro. Life Ins. v. Washington, No. 
8:14-CV-00886-T-24TBM, 2015 WL
5125205 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2015)
2015 Florida No
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. v. Estate of
Morgen, No. 13-2936(MAH), 2015 WL 
12791379 (D.N.J. May 19, 2015)
2015 New Jersey Triable issue 
of fact
Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. v. Pettis, No. 13-
CV-2850-SHL-CGC, 2015 WL
12826634 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2015)
2015 Tennessee Impleader 
granted on
forgery claim
Angelucci v. Aglialoro, No. A-0369-
14T2, 2016 WL 854452 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Mar. 7, 2016)
2016 New Jersey No
Am. Nat’l Ins. v. Hansen, No. 8:17-CV-
341-T-30JSS, 2017 WL 4355597 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 2, 2017)
2017 Florida Triable issue 
of fact
Davis v. Davis, No. 3:15-CV-3-WKW,
2017 WL 3820962 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 
2017)
2017 Alabama No
Prudential Ins. of Am. v. Shuler, No.
1:16-CV-3967-SCJ, 2017 WL 8186688 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2017)
2017 Georgia Yes
Chesapeake Life Ins. v. Parker, No. 18-
C-643, 2018 WL 2766205 (E.D. Wis. 
June 8, 2018)
2018 Wisconsin Triable issue 
of fact
Subtotal: 21
